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“You Say Yemassee, I Say Yamasee”: Recasting the  
Early History of South Carolina 
William L. Ramsey
I thought I was being clever when I came up with the title for this presentation, “You Say Yemassee, I Say Yamasee.”  But several people, mostly younger folks, some of 
them my own students at Lander University, have asked me what I meant by it. 
Well, I was hoping for a catchy, hip, cultural reference, but I suppose, in retro-
spect, this one is a little dated.  It doesn’t become any clearer for younger listeners, I 
now realize, when I explain that Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers sang a song back in 
1937 about pronouncing the words tomato and potato in different ways while roller 
skating in the movie Shall We Dance.  When I continue to explain, usually after an 
awkward silence, that the two different spellings of Yamasee are, surprisingly enough, 
pronounced the same way, whereas the same spellings of tomato and potato once lead 
Rogers and Astaire to the brink of romantic rupture, it doesn’t help much.  
So I’ve pretty much had it with my own speech title.  As a matter of fact, after 
much reflection on the matter, I’m ready to call the whole thing off. 
I thought it up in the first place only because the most frequently asked question 
about my book on the Yamasee War, cleverly entitled The Yamasee War, is why do I spell 
the word Yamasee as I do.  Why not the traditional spelling, Yemassee, as it appears on 
the Rand McNally map of South Carolina, as it appears in most traditional histories 
of the event, as it appears, for heaven’s sake, in William Gilmore Simms’ nineteenth-
century work of fiction about the Yamasee, cleverly entitled The Yemassee?  
It was a question I had not anticipated at my first readings, and my initial, clumsy 
efforts to answer it tended to focus on two basic points, which still hold true as far as 
they go. First, the Yamasees themselves were non-literate Muskhogee/Timuccua language 
speakers.  So they would not have recognized a specific, Anglicized spelling of their name 
as being more or less correct.  Second, the preponderance of the English and Spanish 
language documents I consulted from the early 1700s spelled their name as Yamasee. The 
William Gilmore Simms spelling, on the other hand, appeared nowhere in the colonial 
documents, absolutely nowhere.  As a responsible historian, I told people, I simply used 
the earliest reliable consensus spelling of the name available in the surviving records. 
But there was a bit more to it than I understood at first.  And the more I thought 
about the question, the more I found myself skating a duet of sorts with William Gilm-
ore Simms.  It was Simms, after all, who invented the traditional spelling, Yemassee, in 
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his 1835 novel. I suspect that he was simply trying to make the name appear more 
exotic, more Indian perhaps, for his white readers by defying English phonetic rules. 
And while his fictional treatment of the Yamasee War was never intended as a work 
of historical scholarship, it was, nevertheless, the only other book length treatment of 
the Yamasees and the Yamasee War available until my book was published a couple 
of years ago.  
With respect to the basic facts of the Yamasee War, I can agree with Simms on 
several points. Following their attack on British negotiators at Pocotaligo Town in 
April 1715, Yamasee warriors attacked plantations throughout the South Carolina 
lowcountry.  Joined later by Lower Creek, Apalachee, Savannah, Euchee, Cherokee, and 
Catawba allies, they reduced the colony to a frightened enclave of refugees huddled in 
Charleston.  At the height of the war effort, nearly every Indian nation in the South, 
reaching all the way to the Choctaws in modern day Mississippi, had declared war on 
South Carolina. As one Englishman observed in late 1715, “we are surrounded and 
under attack on every side but the sea-side.”  The colony survived the ordeal, Simms 
and I agree, only by the narrowest of margins. 
It is not fair to Simms to point out the ways in which my work of history is more 
accurate or reliable than his literary fiction, nor is it my point to do so.  It is just as wrong 
to chide him at length for his racism, though it is mighty tempting.  Simms was a man of 
his times, and he believed the war dramatized one of two possible outcomes that might 
be expected when a “superior” race confronted an “inferior” one.  “The superior,” he 
argued, “must necessarily be the ruin of the race which is inferior.”  The only alternative 
to annihilation that Simms held out was for the “inferior race” to acknowledge its status 
and “sink its existence in with that of the other.”  Not surprisingly, Simms arranged to 
have the defiant Yamasees exterminated in a gruesome massacre at the end of his novel, 
while African slaves came to their senses and pledged to serve their white masters faith-
fully.  When offered his freedom in the aftermath of the Yamasee defeat, for instance, 
the Governor’s slave shouts “I dam to hell, mossa, if I guine to be free!” 
Simms is too easy a target for that sort of thing.  Setting him up as a Straw Man 
accomplishes nothing.  Beyond all that, however, beyond even the eccentric spelling 
of the name Yamasee that he invented out of thin air, I believe there is something 
profound at work in his nineteenth-century novel.  I believe, moreover, that it offers a 
meaningful counterpoint to the aspirations of scholars in the twenty-first century and 
provides a good platform for surveying the Yamasee War’s strange career in southern 
historiography.  
First and foremost, Simms sought to cast the war as a watershed in the devel-
opment of southern history, as a defining moment for South Carolina and for the 
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South generally.  And I have sought to do the same. Separating our two versions, of 
course, lies the vast immovable fulcrum of the Civil War.  Where Simms, writing in 
the 1830s, saw the upward sweep of southern nationalism gathering steam, I see, 
instead, its smoking wreckage.  
During the one hundred seventy-three-year interregnum between the publi-
cations of our books, the Yamasee War all but disappeared from popular memory. 
Simms’ understanding of the war lost currency rapidly in the aftermath of the Eman-
cipation Proclamation, and an alternative interpretation was slow to emerge even 
among professional historians.  Not until the publication in 1929 of Verner Crane’s 
classic book on the colonial South, The Southern Frontier, did the Yamasee War make 
another appearance in print.  Crane’s meticulous research explored the imperial ri-
valries between France, Spain, and Great Britain, which increasingly influenced the 
region in the early eighteenth-century.  Although his treatment of the Yamasee War 
was quite brief, consisting of only a single chapter within the book, it was noteworthy 
for its willingness to take Native Americans seriously as historical actors.  He viewed 
the war as an angry response to unprincipled and abusive Carolinians, who allegedly 
beat, raped, and enslaved southeastern Indians.  
Crane’s treatment of the Yamasee War influenced a handful of historians pro-
foundly and became the standard scholarly version for most of the twentieth century. 
Yet this was a relatively limited circle of light.  No book-length efforts to understand 
the event were ever attempted, and its broader meaning for southerners and Americans 
generally remained ambiguous.  Meanwhile, the two other major “Indian Wars” of the 
colonial era, Pontiac’s Rebellion in the Great Lakes region and King Philip’s War in 
New England, became hotbeds of scholarly debate and came to be regarded as defining 
events in the creation of national identity.  
The reasons for this state of affairs are not hard to identify. Those northern 
colonial events produced effects that can be traced comfortably through the Ameri-
can Revolution and the Civil War without interruption.  They function as part of an 
emerging master narrative for a triumphant nation, whereas the Yamasee War inhabits 
a more tragic realm.  If the Yamasee War helped to define a region, and I argue that it 
did, it was a region that went badly awry of the national pattern and ended ultimately 
in the havoc of the Civil War.  Americans, in short, are not yearning to take ownership 
of this particular knowledge.  
Having been raised in a Calvinist household, however, I feel oddly comfort-
able with the prospect of foreordained failure.  For me, investigating the legacy of the 
Yamasee War promises insight into some of the most tangled lessons of the southern 
past.  The conflict clearly deserves a more prominent place, for instance, in discussions 
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about the origins of racial ideology and slavery.  Prior to the outbreak of the war in 
1715, South Carolinians employed a multi-racial slave labor force that included not 
only African laborers but Native American men, women, and children as well.   Ar-
riving in the Carolina lowcountry via a far-flung slave trade that reached all the way 
to the Mississippi River, Indian slaves may have comprised as much as 26 percent of 
the slave population on the eve of the Yamasee War.  That reality made the conflict 
more than a simple struggle for survival against external enemies for Carolinians.  It 
forced them to re-evaluate the internal human landscape of their nascent plantation 
economy and make some ominous decisions about race and slavery that would shape 
the region, I argue, for years to come.  Before the first year of the war ended, they 
had enacted legislation that served to define racial identity more specifically than ever 
before, and they soon forged an official link between the status of slavery and African 
ancestry.  In defending themselves against Native Americans, therefore, Carolinians 
simultaneously defended the enslavement of African Americans. 
The defensive measures they employed to control the enslaved population, 
moreover, involved foundational decisions about the sort of economy that could 
reliably deprive slaves of their freedom.  Having identified the Indian trade as one of 
the causes of the Yamasee War, Carolinians moved to sublimate cross-cultural com-
merce with Native Americans to the needs of the plantation regime.  This was done 
in a number of ways.  For three years following the restoration of peace in 1717, 
for example, the colony established a centralized “factory” system that allowed the 
government to control the Indian trade.  Their intent was to eliminate the subversive 
influence of individual traders, who tended to pursue their own economic self-interest 
at the expense of Carolina’s diplomatic agenda.  The colonial government also sought 
to position free Native American populations strategically as a means of intimidat-
ing African slaves.  This was done conspicuously at the Winyaw Indian factory to 
the northward of Charleston.  There Carolinians discovered that fear of the Winyaw 
Indians tended to keep the slaves “in awe.”  The Yamasee War thus marked the birth 
of a state policy of racial manipulation that Columbia University historian William 
S. Willis called “divide and rule,” in which white Carolinians sought to maneuver 
majority Indian and African populations into opposition against each other in order 
to provide security to the minority European populace.
These may seem like arcane points, but they lie at the heart of my effort to cause 
trouble for historians of the nineteenth-century South and, perhaps, even the ghost 
of William Gilmore Simms.  If South Carolina sought to regulate trade in order to 
preserve the colony’s social order as early as 1716, then we are looking at an economy 
that cannot rightly be called capitalist, no matter how exploitive its labor practices. 
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It was, rather, an economy harnessed to the preservation of elite property and racial 
prerogative.  
This observation causes trouble, I think, or should cause it, because most schol-
arly discussions of the capitalist or non-capitalist nature of the southern economy 
have tended so far to bracket themselves exclusively between the dates of 1800 and 
1865.  These authors, whose names I think most of us here could probably write on a 
napkin before I finish the next sentence, have felt too comfortable in treating the Old 
South as a timeless microcosm without precedent.  The ease with which they specu-
late about the origins of southern distinctiveness without casting a single backward 
glance to the eighteenth century, the American Revolution, or the Yamasee War, is 
simply stunning.  
Worse still, some of these authors have mastered a way of discussing the nine-
teenth-century southern economy without reference to race or racism, as if proslavery 
treatises were born in a Platonic ether of pure mercantile theory.  My ambition is not 
to overturn the debate but to draw its gaze across a greater stretch of time, to remind 
the majority party, as it were, of nineteenth-century Old South specialists that there 
was an older South that gave birth to their epoch, and that race was an issue there as 
well.  It should be a part of their scholarship and part of the public memory of how 
the South’s peculiarity took shape.   
Simms was not laboring against this sort of historical preoccupation, but he, too, 
sought to craft a story that could see clear back to the beginning, a story that could 
shape popular opinion about regional origins and uniqueness.  Here the balance of 
virtues tends to swing in Simms’ favor, I’m afraid, for he was far more widely read and 
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“We Will Strike at the Head and Demolish the Monster”:  The 
Impact of Joel R. Poinsett’s Correspondence on President Andrew 
Jackson during the Nullification Crisis, 1832–1833
Joshua Cain
Between October 1832 and March 1833, Joel R. Poinsett and President Andrew Jackson exchanged a flurry of letters over the crisis in their home state of South 
Carolina, which was threatening to nullify the federal tariffs of 1828 and 1832.  Poin-
sett was Jackson’s most significant advisor in South Carolina, and his correspondence 
greatly influenced Jackson’s decisions and actions throughout the crisis.
Poinsett’s correspondence influenced Jackson in three important ways:  Because 
both men held similar views on the nature of nullification and the Union, Jackson placed 
great trust in Poinsett’s reports from South Carolina. They confirmed that conflict was 
inevitable and informed Jackson’s choices in his attempts to resolve the crisis.
Jackson’s perception that nullification was about ambitious demagogues has 
been well documented by historians and contemporaries. At the Jefferson Day din-
ner of 1830, Jackson toasted “Our Union, it must be preserved.” In response, John 
C. Calhoun, Jackson’s vice president and secret architect of nullification at the time, 
toasted, “The Union, next to our liberty, the most dear.”1 Several days later, a South 
Carolina congressman visited Jackson. The congressman asked Old Hickory if there 
was anything the chief of state wanted conveyed to the people of South Carolina. The 
president said no, but just as quickly changed his mind, stating:   
Yes I have, please give my compliments to my friends in your state, 
and say to them, that if a single drop of blood shall be shed there 
in opposition to the laws of the United States, I will hang the first 
man I can lay my hand on engaged in such treasonable conduct, 
upon the first tree I can reach.2  
Jackson’s comments were shocking in light of his inaction when Georgia refused 
to enforce the Supreme Court’s decision in Worchester v. Georgia. His silence then 
seemed to indicate to at least one Unionist that:  “the old man seems to be more than 
half a Nullifier himself.”3 An upcountry South Carolina editor asked, “Is the tariff act 
more of a Supreme law than a Supreme Court decision?”4 
In July 1832, Jackson endorsed a bill that would modify the tarrif and was favor-
able to the South.  The bill, he told John Coffee, would “nullify the Nullifiers,” and if 
the idea of nullification endured, the bill would at least prove that nullification was an 
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effort of disappointed ambition, originating with unprincipled men who would rather 
rule in hell than be subordinate in heaven.5 When the modification further enraged 
the nullifiers, however,  Jackson decided that tariff reform would not work. 
Poinsett’s beliefs concerning nullification and the Union have not been well 
documented.6 However, just as Jackson maintained an informal “kitchen cabinet” at 
the White House, so, too, he maintained an informal network to gather intelligence 
from around the country,  Poinsett was his most important agent in South Carolina. 
Poinsett was uniquely suited for this endeavor. While acting as the Consul in General 
of the United States to Chile and Argentina between 1810 and 1815, he overstepped 
his diplomatic bounds by aiding militarily the revolutionary juntas in their conflicts 
with the Spanish.7 As the first United States minister to Mexico, he once again violated 
the normal bounds of diplomacy by contributing greatly to the organization of York 
Rite Masonry, a group that eventually became the moniant party within the Mexican 
government in 1828.8 Throughout these experiences, Poinsett developed into a skilled 
organizer and planner, both of which helped him to create a Unionist movement within 
South Carolina. In these endeavors he reported directly to the president, as the case 
would be throughout the Nullification Crisis. Moreover, this crisis provided Poinsett 
with an opportunity to display his military prowess, an attribute that President Jackn 
would find useful.9  
In February 1829, Poinsett expressed his opinion on nullification, stating to 
his cousin Dr. Joseph Johnson:  “to advocate a dissolution of the Union or any act 
of resistance to the execution of the laws of Congress . . . I can never be brought to 
consent, but most assuredly, I am not base enough to regard with indifference any 
act of the general government.”10 The world view Poinsett developed during his years 
abroad uniquely suited him to be President Jackson’s eyes in South Carolina, Having 
seen the effects of weak national overnment in South America and Mexico, Poinsett 
believed in a strong national authority. 
In May 1830 after Poinsett was recalled from Mexico, he met with President 
Jackson. It was then, it seems, that Poinsett became Jackson’s primary agent within 
South Carolina. It was not until February 1832, however, that Poinsett began to fo-
cus on the tariff issue and on nullification. That month, he met with the architect of 
the American System himself, Henry Clay, and with former President John Quincy 
Adams, also a protectionist, on modifying the tariff. While no agreement was made, 
Poinsett told Adams that while both the nullifiers and unionists rejected the American 
system, only the nullifiers viewed nullification and secession as constitutional solutions 
under the states’ rights doctrine11—an important distinction that mirrored Jackson’s 
own thoughts on nullification.
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Poinsett understood the contest in South Carolina was between advocates 
for states’ rights who believed in a perpetual Union and decentralization of power 
and those who believed in a constitutional right to withdraw from the Union. This 
understanding was integral to his relationship with President Jackson. Both men 
were Jeffersonian: they disliked the loose constructionist interpretation that made 
protectionism legal, but they also eschewed secession. Because of this shared ideology, 
Jackson trusted Poinsett.
On 8 October 1832, the congressional and state elections were held in South 
Carolina. The Nullifiers swept the rural tidewater region, controlling thirteen of the 
seventeen parishes and winning 76 percent of the popular votes. Governor Hamilton 
called for a meeting of the new legislature on 20 October, ostensibly to nullify the 
tariff of 1832. While this victory seemed overwhelming, the election was much closer 
than the numbers indicate. The Nullifiers won less than a two-thirds popular majority 
in the entire state, garnering approximately seventeen thousand votes.12
At Seyle’s Hall in Charleston on 15 October, Poinsett denounced those who 
sought to dissolve the Union in order to protect their interests. Moreover, he warned 
the opposition that “those who would trample upon our rights, endanger the liberty 
of the nation, violate that constitution which we venerate, and destroy the union,” 
would be confronted “at all hazards.” Furthermore, Poinsett flatly denounced not only 
nullification, but secession:  
The word secession had been mentioned.  No state, in my opinion, 
has such a right; and the Union could never allow a state to do so.  
It is, therefore, better to bear the evils from which we suffer than to 
tear asunder the Federal Compact.  There is no middle course.13
The Unionist paper, the Charleston Courier, characterized Poinsett as a “man in 
a thunderstorm” standing erect and unmoved, while more “solid hearts were shivered 
to atoms by the forked lightnings.”14 After this speech, Poinsett was clearly seen as the 
leader of the Unionists statewide, and, most importantly, a staunch Jackson man.
The next day, Poinsett penned a letter to Jackson, which would be the first of 
many over the next few months. He informed Jackson of the Nullifiers’ victory at the 
polls, warning him that a state convention would soon be called to instigate an act of 
nullification. According to Poinsett, most Nullifiers believed neither Congress nor the 
president could stop them. Poinsett lamented if this were so, there was nothing to do 
but to “witness the triumph of Mr. Calhoun.” He insisted that the Nullifiers intended 
to break open the customs houses if the collector refused to cooperate. Promising 
to send a list of Nullifiers working in the customs house to Secretary of State Louis 
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McLane, Poinsett warned that even the post office was suspect after he was advised not 
to send a letter to the president through the post office at Charleston. Furthermore, 
Poinsett believed he and his fellow Unionists were going to have to defend themselves 
against “lawless violence and we ought not to be left entirely defenceless [sic], I mean 
without arms and ammunition.”15 Expecting violence, Poinsett stated that he and the 
Unionists were depending on the “measures which will be adopted by the executive 
and an earnest desire to lend our aid to render them effectual.”16
On 29 October 1832, Jackson sent a confidential dispatch to Secretary of War 
Lewis Cass ordering him to warn the officers in charge of the forts in the harbor of 
Charleston to beware of any attempt to seize the forts:  “The attempt will be made to 
surprise the forts and garrisons by the militia, and must be guarded against with vestal 
vigilance and any attempt by force repelled with prompt and exemplary punishment.”17 
Poinsett’s portrayal of the atmosphere in South Carolina confirmed Jackson’s belief that 
the Nullifiers would resort to violence. In his dispatch to Cass, Jackson did not say 
that there “could” be an attempt on the forts, but that there “will” be one. Poinsett’s 
report confirmed to Jackson that conflict was inevitable.18 From this moment on, all 
the measures Jackson undertook in relation to the crisis were devised not to provoke 
conflict, but to prepare for it.  
Jackson responded to Poinsett’s allegations by sending George Breathitt, the 
brother of the governor of Kentucky, ostensibly as a post office inspector to ascertain 
the validity of Poinsett’s claims of disloyalty in the post office and customs house.19 
Breathitt was also to inspect the forts in the harbor.  While Poinsett saw personally to 
this last matter, he sent Breathitt to Columbia, where, on 19 November, the South 
Carolina legislature met in order to call a special convention. Five days later, by a vote 
of 136 to 26, the convention passed the Ordinance of Nullification, which declared the 
tariffs of 1828 and 1832 unconstitutional as well as null and void in South Carolina. 
After 1 February 1833, the ordinance continued, “it shall not be lawful to enforce 
the payment of duties within the limits of this state.”20 If force were used, then the 
people of South Carolina “will thenceforth hold themselves absolved from all further 
obligation to maintain or preserve their political connection with the people of the 
other states, and will forthwith proceed to organize a separate government.”21 The 
state courts were prohibited from questioning the authority of the ordinance or of 
subsequent acts to make it effective. A test oath was to be prescribed by the legislature, 
which bound all officers of the state to obey, execute, and enforce the Ordinance and 
Acts. In cases involving this oath that came to the courts, the jurors were compelled 
to take it. The legislature met as soon as the Convention adjourned. Governor Robert 
Hayne’s message recommended the raising of a State Guard of twelve thousand and 
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suggested a bill of pains and penalties for those who disobeyed the Ordinance and an 
“act of treason” for those who might resist the state in the defense of the Union.22 If 
the Federal government attempted to coerce South Carolina, the state would secede 
from the Union.  
In the wake of these ominous developments, Poinsett reiterated to Jackson the 
allegiance of his Unionists: 
We would rather die, than to submit to the tyranny of such an 
oligarchy as J.C. Calhoun, James Hamilton, Robert Y. Hayne, and 
George McDuffie and we implore our sister states and the federal 
govt. to rescue us from these lawless and reckless men.23
Poinsett, however, worried that some of his fellow Unionists were intimidated 
by the actions of the Nullifiers. He specifically mentioned the opinion of his Unionist 
colleague William Drayton, who believed that letting South Carolina leave the Union 
was the only option available to the United States Congress. Like Jackson, Poinsett 
believed that if one state left, the whole Union would dissolve, leaving the nation in an 
atmosphere much like that in Chile and Mexico. He appealed to Jackson, claiming, “If 
these bad men are put down by the strong arm, the union will be cemented by their 
conduct and by the vigour [sic] of the government, and you will earn the imperishable 
glory of having preserved this great confederacy from destruction.”24 Wary of armed 
conflict, Poinsett worried that his Unionist coalition would be defeated without help 
from the federal government.
As much as Old Hickory agreed with Poinsett, he realized that he could not act 
yet. Responding to Poinsett’s correspondence, Jackson emphasized that if
a posse comitatus prove not strong enough to carry into effect the 
laws of the Union, you have a right to call upon the Government 
for aid and the Executive will yield as far as he has been vested 
with the power by the constitution and the laws made in pursu-
ance thereof.25 
Jackson, conscious of the fact that his reputation had led some to believe he might 
act precipitously, told Poinsett they must proceed with a “firmness such as becomes 
those who are conscious of being right and are assured of the support of public opin-
ion.” And they must, he continued, “perform our duties without suspecting that there 
are those around us desiring to tempt us into the wrong.”26 Having informed Poinsett 
of his reasons for not involving the executive militarily, but fearful of an outbreak of 
violence before the message from Secretary of War Cass arrived, Jackson permitted 
Poinsett to show this letter to the commanding officer to receive whatever he needed 
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to defend the Unionists. Foreshadowing his forthcoming response to South Carolina’s 
ordinance, Jackson stated at the end of this correspondence, “Nullification therefore 
means insurrection and war, and other states have a right to put it down.”27
Jackson reiterated this sentiment several days later when he forwarded a copy 
of the proclamation to Poinsett with a letter stating, “the South Carolina ordinance 
and Hayne’s recommendation to call out the militia was not rebellion, but treason.” 
He assured Poinsett that after he received word of hostilities, he would communicate 
with Congress, and march fifty thousand men in forty days down to South Carolina. 
“The wickedness, madness and folly of the leaders and the delusion of their followers 
in the attempt to destroy themselves and our union has not its parallel in the history 
of the world.”28
To publicly state his own position, President Jackson submitted a document 
known as the Nullification Proclamation. The document repudiated nullification and 
secession while endorsing a nationalist view of the Constitution. The president declared 
that disunion by armed force is treason and warned that the first magistrate could not 
avoid the performance of his duty. Jackson did ask South Carolinians to recant at the 
end, yet he issued the Nullification Proclamation to unequivocally state his administra-
tion’s stance on nullification and the Union in preparation for violence.29  
Jackson knew the message would hurt his party, for it endorsed a strong central 
government over states’ rights. When a member of Jackson’s inner circle suggested he 
delete portions of the message that might offend members of the states rights’ ideol-
ogy, Jackson replied: “Those are my views, and I will not change them nor strike them 
out.”30  Jackson’s decision to write the document in such blunt fashion represented 
his true feelings on the Union and his conviction that conflict was inevitable. His 
proclamation was meant to put forth a new constitutional ideology not only to bring 
the Union together, but also to absolve himself, his administration, and Poinsett’s 
Unionists from any wrong doing when conflict occurred.  
The Nullifiers’ own actions had proved Poinsett’s reports to be true. On Christmas 
day 1832, Jackson wrote to Martin Van Buren explaining that he had just received a 
letter from Poinsett, who claimed that “nothing but force will stop the career of these 
madmen in the south.”31 Furthermore, if Poinsett’s Unionists were to call for aid, he 
would promptly accept it, yet he would do this only after issuing a proclamation for 
the Nullifiers to disperse.32 Even as Jackson was writing Van Buren, he was ordering 
280 federal troops with heavy arms and ammunition down to the federal forts in 
Charleston. Poinsett was not satisfied.  In an obvious reference to the Nullification 
Proclamation, Poinsett complained to Unionist colleague Drayton on 8 January 1833: 
“I go for practical results rather than metaphysical abstract rights.”33
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The same day that Jackson issued his proclamation, a Union Convention met 
in Columbia, South Carolina. It organized committees of correspondence dubbed 
“Washington Societies” to manage Unionist sentiment within South Carolina. In 
case of emergency, they were to become military companies.  Illustrating Poinsett’s 
importance to the Unionists, he was elected commander-in-chief of these Washington 
Societies for the entire state, with Robert Cunningham in charge of the western part 
and D.E. Huger head of the Charleston section.  Poinsett assured the convention that 
President Jackson approved their plans for military organization and that the arsenal 
in Augusta, Georgia, would be opened for the upper part of the state if they needed 
arms.  He then read a letter from Jackson in which the president pledged himself to 
put down nullification with all the power he possessed.34  Many members cried “What 
have we to fear? We are right and God and Old Hickory are with us.”35
As Unionists within South Carolina organized, Old Hickory continued in 
early January to establish a defensive framework. His first action came on 8 January 
when the White House introduced a compromise tariff through New York Senator 
Gulian Verplanck. The tariff was very generous to South Carolina. A week later, on 
16 January, Jackson introduced a second measure. In this, Jackson stated to Congress 
the situation in South Carolina as Poinsett had related to him and requested power 
to move the customs houses at South Carolinian forts to battleships and federal forts 
because they could not be adequately protected from South Carolina’s replevin pro-
cess in Charleston. To stop the Nullifiers from procuring a tariff bond, Jackson asked 
for power to collect all duties in cash. He also requested jails to be established if the 
Nullifiers refused to house Carolinians imprisoned for violating federal laws.36 This 
bill, which became known as the Force Bill, was seen by Nullifiers as a near call to 
arms. In reality, it was Jackson’s last step in making sure that it was clear he had done 
everything he could do to avoid war.
Most historians believe that Jackson focused on the Force Bill to the detriment 
of compromise and to the damage of his own party because he viewed the nullification 
movement as the product of the ambitions of demagogues who sought to gain power 
for themselves.  Many of Jackson’s contemporaries believed he wanted nothing to divert 
attention from his plan to overawe South Carolina.  Some suggested that the Force 
Bill was intended to nullify tariff reform.37 Yet, Jackson’s correspondence with Poinsett 
demonstrates that he was not as confrontational or as militaristic as many thought.
The day that Jackson presented the Force Bill to Congress, he wrote to Poinsett 
advising him to write often and to provide him with early warning of any armed force 
committing treason and of the individuals in charge.  “We will strike at the head and 
demolish the monster, nullification and secession at the threshold by the power of the 
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law.”38  This statement really captures Jackson’s mindset.  Together, he and Poinsett 
would destroy nullification and secession, not by force but by the power of the law.  
For the next two months, Poinsett followed Jackson’s advice. He wrote to Jackson 
seven times in fourteen days at a time when the fastest mail service took four days to deliver 
even important mail from Charleston to Washington D.C. As the Nullifiers’ 1 February 
deadline loomed, Poinsett became increasingly anxious about the Unionist situation in 
Charleston, particularly as rumors of a Nullifier invasion into the city circulated. His first 
letter to Jackson in 1833 came with a copy of a circular letter addressed by Governor James 
Hamilton Jr. to the officers of his staff, instructing them to make all necessary preparations 
for the transportation of troops from the interior to Charleston. Poinsett claimed that 
while no troops had been moved in accordance with this order, “the governor’s aid[e]s are 
already actively engaged in making the necessary arrangements in conformity with the 
instructions contained in this circular.”39  Poinsett’s portrayal of the situation was grim: 
“There are it is true some rash and violent men, who desire to bring on a contest with us 
or with the general government. I almost wish they could be gratified.”40
Despite this statement, Poinsett continued to seek a legal remedy.  As the Nul-
lifiers mobilized to invade Charleston, Poinsett was worried that his Unionist force41 
would be overwhelmed if armed conflict began. A committee of lawyers that he had 
created to ascertain whether the new laws passed by the Ordinance could enforce the 
revenue laws had not yet rendered a decision, and he saw no way under state law that 
those laws could be enforced.42 Poinsett worried that open conflict would occur the 
moment the Nullifiers refused to obey the federal customs official, and that when 
that happened, he and his militia, which was not ready, would be called forth by the 
federal marshal. He lamented to Jackson that the Unionists were unwilling to form a 
posse merely upon the authority of a federal marshal because they feared that, if taken 
prisoner, they would be subject to prosecution under the laws of the state. Rather than 
acting independently, they wanted Jackson to call out the state militia, so they would 
be acting directly upon a presidential order.43  Poinsett warned Jackson that even if the 
marshall called out the posse, there was a “disinclination on the part of the majority 
of the Union Party in Charleston to join in mortal conflict with their adversaries as a 
part of the Posse.”44 Many Unionists feared that if they acted unilaterally as the posse 
comitatus and lost, they would be at the mercy of the Nullifiers. Moreover, Poinsett 
stated that even he was hesitant to order his forces to act because it was “certain in such 
a contest that father would be arrayed against son and brother against brother.”45 
While Poinsett was willing to lead the Unionists into battle, even without 
federal aid, he admitted that without a strong majority, he could not “expose a few 
brave men to the certainty of defeat.”46 He believed if federal troops were stationed in 
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South Carolina, it would embolden his men. He exclaimed to Jackson, “Would not 
raising, embodying and marching troops to Charleston be an overt act of treason? 
Would it not be humanity [sic] to prevent the accumulation of these forces in this 
city?”47 Poinsett feared for the Unionist Party and for his own safety. He was eager to 
hear what Jackson’s course would be in such an event, “not to hasten a conflict, but 
in order to be prepared to coordinate activities with federal forces.”  
Again, on 20 January, Poinsett reiterated his fear over an invasion of Charles-
ton saying,  “we shall be exposed to their insults, which I much doubt if with all the 
Christian forbearance we can exercise, we can long brook.”48 With Charleston secure, 
Poinsett believed their next move would be secession. He assured Jackson that:
 I never will suffer these men to withdraw the state of South Carolina 
from the Union. I will raise the standard against them instantly, but to 
do so with affect and with the united action of the Union party, they 
must act with the countenance of the federal government. The threats 
of the Nullifiers, that the air shall be darkened with our carcasses as 
traitors, appall some, who I believe would have stout hearts if they 
believed themselves safe from such an ignominious death.49  
With this last statement, Poinsett hoped to convince Jackson that the Unionists 
would be more confident with a federal presence. Moreover, Poinsett stated that he 
believed the Nullifiers’ intentions of invading Charleston were meant to bring on a 
contest with the federal government so that other states might come to their aid.50 
Despite all of Poinsett’s warnings, Jackson still hesitated to commit federal troops 
to the state. The president responded to Poinsett, telling him not to fear any assemblage 
of force in Charleston and reassuring him that “I can if need be, which god [sic] forbid, 
march two hundred thousand men in forty days to quell any and every insurrection, or 
rebellion that might arise.” He sent special orders to General Winfield Scott, commanding 
federal troops in Charleston Harbor saying:  “it is the most earnest wish of the president 
that the present unhappy difficulties in South Carolina should be terminated without 
any forcible collision,” but if this were not possible that there should be no question that 
“if such collision does occur it shall not be justly imputable to the United States.”51
As Poinsett continued to lobby Jackson for a federal presence in the state, he 
lashed out at Unionist opinion, which claimed executive intervention was unnecessary. 
William Drayton wrote to Jackson in mid December asking him not to intervene mili-
tarily under existing circumstances.  Angry that Drayton did this without his knowledge 
or consent, Poinsett penned a letter to him.  He sarcastically asked the congressman 
what the Unionists would do if the Nullifiers decided to take Charleston and stated, 
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“The artillery is in the hands of our opponents, and even if we had the ordnance we 
have no artillery men.  Five thousand men have volunteered, and those from Richland 
and Sumter are anxious to be brought down to insult us.”  Poinsett asked Drayton: 
“is embodying and marching men to oppose the laws of the United States an overt 
act of treason?”  Poinsett believed it was, and he reiterated his firm belief that such a 
situation could only be resolved with the intervention of the president, as he saw no 
other way to enforce the revenue laws.52
Poinsett was persistent. On 30 January he wrote to Jackson:  
So much anxiety is expressed by the members of the Union party on 
the subject of the advance of the States Rights forces from the interior, 
that you must pardon me for troubling you so often on the subject.
He then advised the president to encamp a one-thousand-man army at the United 
States arsenal to deter any Nullifier march on Charleston. Hoping to find a way around 
Jackson’s hesitation over legalities, Poinsett stated there was no constitutional objec-
tion to this maneuver.53 A law from 1795 and another from 1807 gave Jackson all the 
technical power he needed to call out state militias and use federal troops to enforce 
federal law.54  Yet even if he could lawfully do so, Jackson would not make any move 
that could be considered tyrannical. He explained his calculated pause to Van Buren: 
“I must appeal to Congress to give authorities the power to apprehend traitors. . . . 
Was I therefore to act without the aid of Congress, or without communicating with 
it, I would be branded with the epithet, tyrant.”55
As Jackson sought to build support for the Force Bill, Senator Henry Clay of 
Kentucky, whom Poinsett believed would not budge on tariff reform, was putting 
together a compromise bill. Hoping to keep Jackson from claiming any credit for 
defusing the situation, he quickly presented his compromise tariff on 12 February 
1833.  His compromise guaranteed that no duty was to exceed 20 percent after a du-
ration of a decade.56 Anxious to end the standoff, Senator John C. Calhoun of South 
Carolina as well as other moderate Nullifiers were willing to listen to Clay’s proposal. 
Moreover, Calhoun wanted to deny the president any credit in the peaceful ending of 
the controversy. Clay the protectionist and Calhoun the Nullifier had little regard for 
Jackson and enough in common to work together both for the sake of compromise 
and to defeat their shared political nemesis. 
Through his contacts in the House of Representatives, Clay substituted his own 
compromise tariff for the Verplanck Bill. Clay’s bill, known as the Compromise Tariff 
of 1833, passed both houses of Congress on 1 March 1833. The new tariff put many 
protected goods on the free list and provided that rates on protected products would 
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be lowered in gradual stages to the 20 percent level by mid 1842.57 Nullifiers construed 
the tariff as a victory due to their threats, and they never renounced nullification. As 
a final act of defiance, South Carolina nullified the Force Bill on 18 March 1833. 
President Jackson decided to ignore this last act of defiance.
Throughout early 1833, Jackson hoped Poinsett’s posse comitatus would be 
enough to deter any conflict until Federal troops arrived¸ but Poinsett’s claims to the 
contrary kept him focused on quick passage of the Force Bill. Poinsett’s role in keeping 
Jackson preoccupied with the threat of hostilities is shown in a letter from Silas Wright 
to Martin Van Buren dated 13 January 1833. Wright’s letter reported a meeting he had 
with President Jackson and Secretary of War Louis McLane. Wright stated that Jackson 
did not believe any bill passed in regard to the tariff would prevent hostilities in South 
Carolina, but he hoped it would satisfy the rest of the South so that when violence 
commenced, it would not interfere. Wright indicated that McLane also believed that 
tariff reform would not prevent armed conflict. Lastly, he explained that a letter from 
General Winfield Scott had just been received. Scott said he, too, believed there was 
nothing that could prevent bloodshed.58  
Throughout the crisis, Poinsett made it clear that the Nullifiers real object was 
secession and that even though the crisis was over, they were “determined to go on 
in their mad career.”59 Jackson also believed Nullification was a prelude to something 
larger.  Writing to the Reverend Andrew J. Crawford on 1 May 1833, Jackson explained 
that Clay’s tariff bill was more protectionist than his own.  He prophetically stated, “if 
this is not protection, I cannot understand, therefore the tariff was only the pretext 
and disunion and a southern confederacy the real object. The next pretext will be the 
negro, or slavery question.”60  
Poinsett’s admonitions as well as Jackson’s particular idea of republicanism led him 
to believe the Nullifiers were using the tariff as an excuse to create a southern confederacy. 
As Richard Latner pointed out in his article “The Nullification Crisis and Republican 
Subversion,” Jackson’s particular view of republicanism led him to find the source of 
nullification in ambitious men seeking to create a southern confederacy, rather than in 
slavery; it also explains why he lost faith in tariff reform and relied on seemingly military 
measures.61  It was Poinsett’s correspondence and the nature of those letters, however, 
that solidified Jackson’s beliefs and contributed to his decisions during the crisis.
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“Ever Able, Manly, Just and Heroic”:
 Preston Smith Brooks and the Myth of Southern Manhood
Ken Deitreich
Although he was a central figure in a notorious event of American history, namely his May 1856 assault upon Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner, Preston 
Brooks is largely a forgotten figure today. Even professional historians have shown 
little interest in him. As of this writing, Robert Neil Mathis’s 1978 article in South 
Carolina Historical Magazine represents the only serious scholarly work yet done on 
Brooks.1 This lack of interest is due, at least in part, to the fact that Brooks is largely 
regarded as a villain, an unthinking brute who savagely attacked a congressional col-
league for simply speaking his mind.2 The epitaph quoted above in the title of this 
study indicates, however, that other contemporaries viewed him in a more positive 
light.3 But, love him or hate him, there is no denying Brooks’s place in history. His 
assault upon Sumner, an incident history remembers as the “Caning of Sumner,” both 
drew upon and exacerbated the sectional tensions that hastened the coming of the 
Civil War. As a key player in an incident of such notoriety, Brooks warrants a greater 
degree of historical scrutiny than he has heretofore received.
Contemporary reaction to the “Caning” was both extreme and predictably 
sectional.4 Fairly typical of northern reaction was a New York Tribune editorial that 
loudly proclaimed: “No meaner exhibition of Southern cowardice – generally miscalled 
Southern chivalry – was ever witnessed.”5 Southerners argued, with equal fervor, that 
Sumner had only gotten what he deserved. Brooks suddenly found himself hailed 
as the hero of the South.6 These opposing sentiments continue to influence modern 
perceptions of Brooks and the attack upon Sumner.7
But what seems to be missing from these contrasting images of Brooks is a sense 
of the man himself: who he was and why he attacked Charles Sumner. This paper 
seeks to address this oversight by taking a fresh look at the motivations for his attack 
within the context of his life-story. Specifically, it seeks to understand the antebellum 
notions of manhood that may have influenced Brooks in general, and what role such 
notions may have played in the violent events of 23 May 1856.
The culture of violence within the antebellum South was an important context 
for any appraisal of Brooks’s actions.8 Nineteenth-century southern males have been 
described by contemporaries and historians alike as “swaggering, belligerent . . . quick 
to take offense, quick to go to war, and, when at war, quick to mount a direct assault.”9 
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This predilection for violence may have been even more pervasive among the planter 
elite, whose members were taught from an early age to think of themselves as the better 
sort and who embraced certain qualities, often associated with chivalry, that included 
honor, morality, veneration of women, and, especially, martial spirit.10 Just as blacks 
were indoctrinated to their status as slaves, so, too, were upper-class southern whites 
indoctrinated to their status as masters. While slaves were trained to be submissive and 
obedient, upper-class whites were trained to be dominant and commanding. Given 
the nature of southern society and the need to control a large slave population, this 
indoctrination process was, arguably, essential to the maintenance of the region’s social 
structure. If the plantation system were to survive, it was essential to develop a cadre 
of strong and aggressive males capable of sustaining it.11 All of these factors, when 
combined with the wealth, isolation, and nearly autocratic authority that plantation 
slavery afforded, bred within planters a belief that they were superior not only to their 
slaves but to their white neighbors as well.12
Preston Smith Brooks was born on 6 August 1819 near the village of Edgefield 
Court House, South Carolina.13 Few communities in America can claim to have pro-
duced as many noteworthy public figures as the sprawling Edgefield District, a list that 
included Governors Francis W. Pickens and Pierce Mason Butler, Alamo defenders 
James Bonham and William Barrett Travis, General James Longstreet, United States 
Senators Andrew Pickens Butler, Lewis T. Wigfall, “Pitchfork” Ben Tillman, and, 
more recently, J. Strom Thurmond.14 In addition to this tradition of political and 
military leadership, Edgefield also possessed a well-deserved reputation for violence 
and mayhem. Lewis Wigfall alone is known to have fought at least two duels during 
his life and to have come close to duelling on three other occasions.15
Brooks possessed an extremely distinguished pedigree. His father, Whitfield 
Brooks, Sr., was a successful planter and slave-owner who had served after 1814 as 
commissioner in equity for Edgefield District. Through his paternal grandfather, 
Zachariah Smith Brooks, Preston claimed kinship with the Butler clan, one of the 
most powerful families in the antebellum South. Included among his esteemed Butler 
kin were the Revolutionary War hero General James Butler, Pierce Mason Butler and 
his brother Andrew Pickens Butler, and James Butler Bonham.16  
Growing up as a member of the planter elite – with their aristocratic preten-
sions –  in such a combative community environment, young Brooks was constantly 
reminded of his elite status and of the obligations that it carried. Indeed the image 
of his cousin James Bonham facing down hordes of Mexican soldiers at the Alamo 
must have made a powerful impression upon him and left no doubt  as to what was 
expected of him as a white southern male.17 
29
The Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association 2011
Judging from what is known of him, he not only understood those expecta-
tions, but actively endeavored to fulfill them and to project the image of an aggressive 
and commanding man.18 At South Carolina College, Brooks earned a reputation as a 
capable student and “a favorite with the ladies”19 who engaged in rowdy behavior. He 
was disciplined for such infractions as leaving campus without permission, frequent-
ing a local tavern, and fighting with another student. Then in November 1839, just 
before he was due to graduate, Brooks attempted to break his brother James Hampden 
Brooks out of jail. The incident ended peacefully, but it proved the last straw for the 
faculty, who expelled Brooks without granting his degree.20
This aggressive behavior continued. During the 1840 gubernatorial campaign, 
Brooks became embroiled in a bitter and potentially deadly dispute with Lewis T. Wigfall, 
which led to a duel on 11 November. Both men suffered serious injuries: Wigfall was 
struck in the leg; Brooks in the hip, incurring a painful wound that took weeks to heal. 
Despite the fact that both men were lucky not to have been killed, the duel failed to 
resolve the dispute. Brooks and Wigfall nearly fought a second duel in July 1841.21
This same desire to prove himself an aggressive southern male would be, this 
study contends, at least partly to blame for the attack upon Sumner fifteen years 
later. The immediate provocation was, of course, Sumner’s “Crime Against Kansas” 
speech (19–20 May 1856) in which he described South Carolina’s Senator Andrew 
Butler, Brooks’s cousin, as one who had: 
read many books of chivalry, and believes himself a chivalrous knight, 
with sentiments of honor and courage. Of course he has chosen a 
mistress to whom he has made his vows, and who, though ugly to 
others is always lovely to him; though polluted in the sight of the 
world, is chaste in his sight – I mean the harlot, Slavery. For her, his 
tongue is always profuse in words. Let her be impeached in character, 
or any proposition made to shut her out from the extension of her 
wantonness, and no extravagance of manner or hardihood is then too 
great for this senator [Butler]. The phrenzy [sic] of Don Quixote, in 
behalf of his wench, Dulcinea del Toboso, is all unsurpassed.22
Sumner’s meaning could not have been clearer. Butler and his fellow southerners 
might claim to be paragons of Christian virtue, but in their slavish devotion to slavery 
they were, in fact, baser than the poor whites whom they so despised. Having estab-
lished their dominance over the weak and the defenseless, southerners now threatened 
to break up the national government if it did not assist them in perpetuating their 
exploitation and barbarism.23 But even worse was to come. The next day (20 May), 
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Sumner continued his attack upon Butler, ungraciously mocking Butler’s speech 
impediment, which had been caused by a prior stroke. Referring to Butler’s recent 
remarks on Kansas, Sumner said that Butler had “discharged the loose expectoration 
of his speech” upon the people of the Territory.24  
In a speech that dripped with venom, these passages are particularly offensive, even 
to the modern reader. Sumner had clearly abandoned any pretense of forensic analysis 
and was simply indulging in the basest sort of character assassination. As might be 
expected, Sumner’s speech provoked strong outrage among his Democratic opponents. 
Senator Stephen Douglas of Illinois roundly condemned the “libels (and) gross insults” 
of Sumner’s remarks. In fact Sumner’s words were deemed so offensive that Douglas had 
to wonder whether his purpose in making the speech was “to provoke some of us to kick 
him as we would a dog in the street, that he may get sympathy upon the just chastise-
ment?”25 Senator James Mason of Virginia declared that only his duty to his state and his 
respect for the Senate’s rules allowed him to sit and listen to such “loathsome deformities 
in accusation and vilification” as were contained within Sumner’s speech.26
As expected, Brooks was outraged by what he regarded as an attack not only 
upon Butler, but on the entire South. As a self-styled southern gentleman, Brooks felt 
honor bound to respond.27 As he later explained: “I should have forfeited my own 
self-respect, and perhaps the good opinions of my countrymen if I had failed to resent 
such an injury by calling the offender in question to a personal account.”28
Brooks’s decision to call Sumner “to a personal account” might soon make for good 
drama, but more significant here was the fact that Brooks chose not to challenge Sumner 
to a duel. First of all, believing as he did that “the moral tone of mind that would lead 
a man to become a Black Republican would make him incapable of courage,” Brooks 
assumed that Sumner would not accept the challenge, especially as dueling was illegal in 
Washington D.C.29 But a more fundamental reason for Brooks to refrain from challenging 
Sumner to a duel was that such an action would have lent the latter a social respectability 
that he (and a Republican at that) did not merit. That left only one alternative: physical 
chastisement.30 But perhaps most significant was not that the “Caning” perfectly charac-
terized Brooks’s usual behavior, but rather that it was both typical and atypical. Despite 
his aristocratic upbringing, with its emphasis upon honor and “chivalric” conduct, not 
to mention the violent nature of southern life in general, it bears noting that Brooks was 
not, generally speaking, given to violent outbursts. In fact, as Robert Mathis pointed out, 
Brooks often went out of his way to avoid confrontation.31 
Several events of the decade preceding the assault underscore Brooks’s hyper-
sensitivity regarding his personal honor.  His controversial service in the Mexican War 
(1846–48) provides the focus. His regiment, the South Carolina Volunteers or Palmetto 
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Guards, saw action in a number of engagements, most notably at Churubusco, where 
they suffered extremely high casualties. Among the dead in that battle were his younger 
brother, Whitfield Brooks, Jr., and his cousin, Colonel Pierce M. Butler.32 But while 
Whitfield Brooks and Pierce Butler both died heroically, Preston Brooks’s own war 
record was far less heroic. Soon after arriving in Mexico, he came down with what was 
probably typhoid fever and was sent home to convalesce. Back in Edgefield, Brooks 
was so sharply criticized by neighbors that within a month he was begging the War 
Department to send him back to Mexico. In the end, he decided not to wait for orders 
and returned on his own initiative, too late as it turned out. By the time he reached 
Mexico again, the fighting was pretty much over. 33
After the war, the perception continued to grow that he had acted less than 
honorably in Mexico. Matters came to head at the 1849 July Fourth celebration, at 
which Edgefield honored its Mexican War veterans in a public ceremony but com-
pletely excluded Preston Brooks from the proceedings.34 When Brooks demanded an 
explanation, the event’s organizers replied, so he reports, that he had been “placed on 
the same footing” with Milledge Luke Bonham. The latter, another Brooks cousin 
and Lieutenant Colonel of an infantry regiment, had been similarly criticized for his 
“delay in returning to the war” after being accidentally shot in the foot.35 When told 
this, Brooks rashly declared: “to this I object for although I know Bonham to be a 
brave man – yet his courage has been questioned – mine has not.” After an exchange 
of angry letters, Bonham demanded “a hostile meeting” to settle the issue. Fortunately, 
cooler heads prevailed, and the dispute was peacefully resolved.36 
To an even greater degree than the “Caning” itself, the “Bonham Affair” clearly 
illustrates the importance that southerners attached to matters of honor. Obviously 
both Brooks and Bonham considered honor to be a deadly serious matter, one that was 
worth fighting for, even with a close relative. But in lashing out at Milledge Bonham, 
Brooks was really striking back at his Edgefield detractors. His emotional reaction to 
being placed “on the same footing” with Bonham may have been a response to his 
own sense of guilt at having fled the war zone. Brooks might claim to be indifferent 
to the “sly mendacity of hints,” but the implication that he had failed to meet the 
expectations of southern manhood had perhaps struck a chord. The fact that Milledge 
Bonham was a relative and the brother of fallen Alamo hero James Bonham only served 
further to inflame the situation.37 
As important as manly honor was, one should not overlook the role that political 
ambitions and hopes played in Brooks’s self regard and in the events that were about to 
unfold. Elected in 1853 as the representative of South Carolina’s Fourth Congressional 
District, the same district that had once elected John C. Calhoun, Brooks faced very 
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high expectations. And yet during his two terms in office he introduced no major 
legislation and had been criticized by constituents for being “a little too national” 
during the debates over the Kansas-Nebraska Act.38 
In light of the criticism of his Mexican War service, his failure to duel Milledge 
Bonham and his – thus far – somewhat lackluster performance in Congress, Brooks’s 
attack upon Sumner takes on a deeper meaning than mere sectional politics. Sumner’s 
verbal assault upon Andrew Butler, while it undoubtedly outraged Brooks, also perhaps 
presented him with an opportunity for redemption, both politically and as a man. 
Having failed to defend southern and family honor on the battlefields of Mexico and 
back home in Edgefield, he would do so in the halls of Congress.39 If Brooks had, 
in fact, sought personal and political redemption through his assault on Sumner, he 
succeeded beyond all expectations. As noted at the beginning of this study, he was 
lionized as the avenging chastiser of northern abolitionists until his premature death 
(on 27 January 1857) from croup, less than a year after the “Caning.”
Preston Brooks was keenly aware of both his status as a member of the planter 
elite and the expectations that came with that status. It is equally obvious to us, and 
probably was to him, that he had often failed to live up to those expectations. With a 
few notable exceptions, the pattern that emerges from Brooks’s life was impetuosity, 
hypersensitivity, and unproductiveness – up to this point – as a warrior and politician, 
not the boldness of one who met challenges head-on. Certainly there was nothing 
particularly bold or courageous about the way in which he attacked a defenseless and 
immobilized Charles Sumner, a fact that northerners quickly seized upon.
This was well illustrated by an incident that took place only a few days after the 
“Caning” in which Congressman Anson Burlingame of Massachusetts accused Brooks 
of striking Sumner when the latter was not looking. Brooks promptly challenged 
Burlingame to a duel. A crack rifleman, Burlingame accepted; but when he chose the 
Canadian side of Niagara Falls as the location for this matter of honor, Brooks backed 
out, claiming that he dared not travel to Canada due to the northern mobs that would 
surely threaten him on the way. Northerners immediately branded Brooks a coward 
and mocked him in verse saying: 
To Canada Brooks was asked to go
To waste of powder a pound or so
He sighed as he answered no, no, no,
They might take my life on the way, you know.40 
What does this study tell us, then, about the ideology of southern manhood? 
Was it, as some have suggested, largely a myth? The fact that Preston Brooks went to 
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such extreme lengths to prove himself manly and honorable demonstrates that, for 
him at least, the idea that men should be bold, aggressive, and courageous was not a 
myth. And despite the fact that Brooks may have felt that he had too often failed to 
live up to these standards, such an ideology proved no less meaningful to him or to 
many other fellow white southern males. 
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“Firm and Immovable as Rocks”: 
Native American Women’s Empowerment in the  
Jesuit Missions of New France
Ivy Farr McIntyre
Introduction 
In the fall of 1677, a young girl named Kateri Tekakwitha left her home, her family, and her way of life to join the French Jesuit mission at Kahnawake, a few miles from her 
native village near what is now Montreal, Canada. She was the product of what historian 
James Merrell calls the “Indians’ New World”: her mother was an Algonquian captive and 
her father a member of a Mohawk tribe.1 In the early 1660s, a smallpox epidemic killed her 
parents, leaving Tekakwitha scarred, orphaned, and under the care of her uncle, who was 
vehemently against the French and the Jesuits. When Kateri was about twenty years old, 
she escaped from her family to join a community of women at the Christian mission of 
Kahnawake. There, Tekakwitha embraced Christianity with a particular fervor, adopting an 
extreme form of religious asceticism that surprised even her Jesuit mentors. She impressed a 
number of women with her zeal and created a group of followers. When she died only two 
years later, they continued her ascetical practices after her death.2 
As Father Claude Dablon reported from the Quebec mission in 1672, some Indian 
women “remain[ed] as firm and immovable as Rocks before the insults of their infidel rela-
tives,—preferring to suffer opprobrium and scorn and even to continue in extreme poverty, 
rather than betray their [Christian] Faith.”3 What prompted Kateri and other women to leave 
their homes and the culture they had always known to follow a group of strange men and an 
alien religion, even while being scorned by the families they left behind? What did conver-
sion to Christianity provide these women and why did some of them adopt the new faith so 
intensely that they risked displeasure from their traditional gods, and, in some extreme cases, 
even illness and death from ascetic rituals and self-mortification, all to follow Christianity? 
A great part of the answers to these questions must lie in the nature of their religious faith, 
an area difficult to comprehend fully through traditional historical analysis.
Such considerations aside, this paper will take a different approach to the prob-
lematic just outlined above. At this point, the suggestive and tentative aspects of the 
suggested methodology are fully acknowledged. The intent is to explore various roles 
of empowerment that Native American women could and did assume in the Jesuit 
Christian missions between 1670 and 1690. According to historian Bruce Trigger, the 
end of the seventeenth century marked a period of low “self-confidence” for Native 
Americans in New France.4 Perhaps it can be argued that French Jesuits capitalized 
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on this period of insecurity, conquering Native Americans, Europeanizing them, and, 
in the process, subjugating Indian women. But when examining the Jesuit Relations, 
the narrative documents constructed after 1611 from Jesuit missionary reports that 
chronicled annually the progess of conversion of several Native American peoples in 
New France, in light of recent sociological theories of empowerment, a much different 
picture of Christian Indian women in French Jesuit missions emerges. 
The empowerment of Native American women varied by village and tribe. For 
example, the Iroquois tended to be matrilineal, while Algonquian peoples were patrilineal. 
These arrangements derived from different patterns of agriculture, hunting, and gathering; 
they resulted in women having different measures of power depending on their status in 
the tribe. Nevertheless, Indian women in what would become New France typically had 
more authority than early modern European women had in their society. The patriarchal 
and hierarchical nature of the early modern Catholic church taught some Jesuits to reject 
the relatively egalitarian nature of Native American society. According to some historians, 
the Jesuits sought to replace that egalitarianism with the asymmetric gender roles of French 
society.5 The missions’ heterogenous composition itself could have aided this alleged Jesuit 
policy, for they comprised a mix of many different tribes of Indians, especially following 
periods of disease or brutal warfare, as refugees flocked to the missions for shelter. 
But if this was the case, some Native American women were not receptive to such 
a policy; instead, they found ways of making the missions work to their own advantage. 
Identity empowerment theory, a modern sociological concept, suggests that women can 
increase their quality of life, no matter how restrictive their circumstances, by increas-
ing their awareness of their own decisions and actions.6 Religion is one of the most 
important contributors to this self-awareness. Although patriarchal institutions often 
use religion to limit women’s actions, lives, and opportunities, careful choices about 
religion can lead to an improvement of one’s quality of life, sense of independence, and 
sense of self-worth.7 As applied in the world today, identity empowerment theory sug-
gests changes women can make in their daily lives that will enhance and improve their 
lives, no matter how restricted they are by their environment.8 As applied over three 
hundred years ago to Christian Indian women in the missions of New France, identity 
empowerment theory lends a new perspective to the well-known Jesuit Relations. 
Recent Scholarship and Methodology
Most historians interpret the goal of the Jesuit missions in New France as European-
ization as much as Christianization, and they see the subjugation of Native American 
women to men as a crucial part of Europeanization. James Ronda argues that “[t]he 
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Indian who embraced Christianity was compelled, in effect, to commit cultural sui-
cide.”9 Indians had to renounce their native ways and conform to European standards 
instead. Ronda argues that the Jesuits intended to bring about a cultural revolution, 
to Europeanize the Native Americans in every aspect of life. Mona Etienne and 
Eleanor Leacock assert that capitalism, colonialism, and Christianity all depend on 
gender inequality; when Europeans began their colonizing efforts, Native American 
women’s status degraded. Native American women lost power, even though some 
vehemently resisted the new religion and the Jesuits.10 Studies published since Etienne 
and Leacock’s work give a more complex picture of Jesuit-Indian relations dependent 
on native background, tribal affiliation, relationships with capitalism and the New 
World economy, and the background of the colonials. Clara Sue Kidwell notes that 
important Indian women appear in every story of Euro-American encounter, par-
ticularly in aiding white men by translating.11 Sexual relations were an important 
part of the interactions between Native American women and European men outside 
the Jesuit mission. Carol Devens contends that conversion to Christianity restricted 
Native American women in that the latter perceived little advantage in Christianity 
and felt limited by it. She further argues that Native American women preserved their 
autonomy by rejecting Christianity.12 Karen Anderson has a similar view and interprets 
male antagonism toward women in fur-trapping societies. She discusses Huron and 
Montagnais Indians who, she asserts, transferred the aggression they normally released 
in traditional Indian warfare and dream ceremonies to “unruly” women once Indian 
men converted to Christianity.13 
This study argues that women could claim autonomy through conversion as 
well.14 Most of the recent work on women’s empowerment through Christianity comes 
from psychologists and sociologists.15 Sacred images, religious language, and church 
practices are often patriarchal in nature, yet women throughout history have represented 
a disproportionately large portion of the Christian population. The only historian to 
discuss women’s empowerment through Christianity in this context is Natalie Zemon 
Davis in her study of Marie de L’Incarnation, a French woman who became a nun 
and helped found an Ursuline convent and the first hospital in New France. Davis 
argues that Marie, as a mystic, sidestepped European gender hierarchies within the 
convent. Davis also contends that Native American women expanded their public voice 
in New France society while in the confines of the Ursuline convents. Here she deals 
with women’s empowerment in a cloistered environment, not the more open Jesuit 
missions investigated below.16 Theologian Ursula King asserts that instead of being an 
oppressive institution for all women, Christianity has many links with feminism. She 
argues even further that Christianity and feminism are mutually essential for either 
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movement to be successful. She cites several “counter-cultural” traditions in the Christian 
church that produced extraordinary women, including female ascetics, nuns, saints, and 
mystics, but says that history fell silent on these topics until the feminist movement of the 
twentieth century. The Christian gospel calls for freedom and equality – although ecclesial 
institutions have not often emphasized those aspects – and King sees both feminism and 
Christianity as movements of liberation.17
This study reinterprets the Jesuit Relations in light of identity empowerment theory 
and proposes that converted Indian women used Christianity in part to claim three degrees 
of autonomy and power within the missions of New France: conversion, leadership, and, 
in extreme cases, asceticism. The first way in which Native American women claimed more 
power in the missions was through the process of simple conversion: women removed 
themselves from their native villages and chose to join a new community. Some women 
then created leadership roles in the missions by helping to convert others, by acting as 
translators, or by proselytizing to potential new converts. Through these roles, women 
claimed more power than they had had in their native communities, where men were 
the teachers and preservers of religion.18 Only a few women claimed the third level of 
autonomy, namely, religious asceticism, a form of self-imposed punishment for perceived 
sin. The few women who adopted severe penitence rituals in the Christian community 
took greater control over their own faith and religious experience by seeking a more direct 
relationship with the Deity outside close Jesuit supervision. In each of these situations, 
women created a partial counter-culture to the one of unquestioning subordination that 
the Jesuits proposed, increased their own voices within the community, and enhanced 
their spiritual relationship with a higher power, all in the name of religion.
Conversion
Converting to Catholicism was no easy task for an Indian woman, and the Jesuits often 
wrote about women who left their families to join the missions. Leaving her home and 
converting to Christianity was one way an Indian woman could claim more autonomy, for 
it entailed a decision to change her lifestyle. Kateri Tekakwitha is one example of a woman 
who went against her family’s wishes to join the Christian missions. As a young girl, she 
lived with her uncle, who opposed Christianity. While Kateri was recovering from a foot 
injury, a Jesuit priest introduced her to the Christian faith, and Kateri asked to be baptized. 
A few months later, Kateri’s older sister joined the mission at Kahnawake; soon after, Kateri 
defied her uncle and sneaked away from her home to join the mission herself.19 
One Mohawk widow, who remains anonymous in the Jesuit Relations, came 
to Quebec in 1671 with her two small children in order, wrote Father Dablon, “to 
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secure greater freedom in her devotional exercises, from which she was diverted by her 
kinsfolk.”20 In her native village she had possessed the status of Oiander, an inherited 
title in the Mohawk nation and one that was highly esteemed.21 Her conversion to 
Christianity, wrote Father Dablon, “so incensed all her family that, out of spite, they 
degraded her from her noble rank, in an assembly of the Village notables.”22 She had 
abandoned the wealth and comfort she enjoyed in her native village to join the Christian 
mission where she possessed nothing; she indicated thereby that for her there were 
seemingly no material benefits to conversion.  
Historian Allan Greer suggests that bonds of friendship may have motivated some 
women to join Christian missions. Kateri Tekakwitha, for example, may have joined 
the mission at Kahnawake to be closer to her older sister, but once she established 
herself there, her conversion took on a much greater significance, as it did for many 
other women.23 According to Greer, the Jesuits had very little contact with Christian 
converts after they performed baptismal rites, so older Indian women in these com-
munities acted as confessors, preachers, and disciplinarians for other members.24  Upon 
Kateri’s arrival at Kahnawake, a native woman who had been baptized with the name 
Anastasia appointed herself as Kateri’s “confessor,” and other women of the commu-
nity taught Kateri and other newcomers the ways of the mission and the teachings 
of Christianity.25 Native American women who moved to Jesuit missions and joined 
female communities also overcame the isolation they might have felt in their native 
villages, be it scorn from family members or relatives for accepting Christianity or for 
various other reasons. 
Leadership
Historians frequently mischaracterize the motives of native conversion to Christian-
ity because French Jesuits did offer some material benefits to Indians who agreed to 
convert. Neither material goods nor improved opportunities for fur trading, however, 
explain why some Christian Indian women assumed leadership roles in the missions, 
teaching others about Christianity and serving as translators to help the Jesuits gather 
more converts. Christian Indian women defended the faith to Native Americans 
and other critics of Christianity and persuaded their families and other tribesmen to 
convert along with them. These women gained a level of autonomy beyond making 
the choice to convert to Christianity; they strove to have their voices heard in small 
groups of Indians as well as by entire nations. The leadership roles they accepted and 
created in the Christian community gained Christian women notoriety and increased 
their independence and autonomy. 
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The Christian Indian woman Marie Tsinouentes encapsulated these leadership roles. 
In 1669, Father Jean Pierron recorded that Marie had instructed a tortured captive “in 
our mysteries.”26 Later, she defended the Catholic faith to a group of Dutch Protestants, 
who had long been enemies of the French and the Jesuits. When the Dutch criticized 
Marie for wearing a rosary, she and two other women defended the symbols of their faith. 
Taking them “boldly in hand,” Marie said, “You will all be damned,” and criticized them 
for seeking “only our Beavers, and not the salvation of our souls.”27 Marie took a great risk 
in chastising this group of men, an act that would have been outside the prescribed gender 
role of Europeanized Christian women. According to historian Karen Anderson, “[f ]or 
the seventeenth-century Jesuits, women’s subordination to men was part of God’s plan 
for humanity, necessary for good order in society, essential for the existence of Christian 
marriages, indispensable for human salvation.”28 At least in these cases, Marie rejected 
European gender roles, and the Jesuit Pierron supported her decision. 
Let us consider another example. In 1671, it was reported that one woman, perhaps 
the same Mohawk widow mentioned earlier, returned to the Mohawk nation in order to 
convince the people she had left behind to convert to Christianity.29 After trying to persuade 
her father, she implored the entire nation: “People of Gannaouaé,” she said to them, 
You listened to me, in times past, in the Councils; but now I much 
more deserve a hearing as I am addressing you regarding your 
eternal salvation, and the most important business that you have 
in this world. Listen to those who teach you and believe them; but 
renounce immediately with me those wicked practices devised by 
our arch-enemies, the demons of hell…Your attachment thereto 
. . . stops your ears, and prevents the doctrine of salvation, which 
is taught you, from reaching your hearts. Follow my advice; oth-
erwise all the prayers that we daily offer to the divine Majesty on 
your behalf will avail you naught. Ah, my brothers, why do you 
not recognize the woes suffered in hell by those who have died in 
unbelief or in their sins, and who have not kept their promises made 
at Baptism? What a pity that I cannot make you understand the 
happiness that you will enjoy in heaven if you will believe me!30
This is an example of a woman who claimed the voice of a Christian missionary. As a 
former leader in her native village and a current leader in the mission, she implored 
other Mohawks to listen to the Jesuits and to convert to Christianity. 
While some women spoke to their families and tribesmen to urge them to con-
vert, other women aided the Christian mission directly and claimed more autonomy for 
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themselves by translating the Jesuits’ messages to other Indians. Father Jacques Fremin, 
superior over the Jesuit missions to the Seneca Indians at St. Michel, lamented in 1670 that 
a captive woman had arrived at the mission and soon had developed a terrible illness for 
which he was powerless to help. At the last moment before her death, two Christian Indian 
women appeared and spoke words of comfort to her. “I asked them,” Fremin wrote, “if 
they would have the kindness to act as my interpreters in procuring everlasting happiness 
for the sick woman,”31 They complied and convinced the woman to convert just before 
her death. Father Pierron eventually replaced Father Fremin at Tionontoguen, the central 
village of the Mohawk nation. Around 1669, Pierron also described a nameless Mohawk 
woman who took pride in teaching the Christian faith to the children at the mission and 
was even so bold as to instruct him to complete what she had started.32
In assuming responsibility for the religious education of other converts, women also 
overturned traditional native gender roles. Before European contact, only the Indian men 
taught, learned, and perpetuated oral religious traditions formally, although women did 
relate religious stories to Indian children.33 Men served as healers and shamans within Native 
American communities and also interpreted dreams, while women typically acted only as 
assistants to the male shamans.34 Anastasia, Kateri Tekakwitha’s “confessor,” went even a step 
further, mimicking in this capacity the role of a Jesuit priest. Informal teaching provided an 
opportunity for Christian Indian women to step outside traditional and even contemporary 
gender roles while staying safely within the boundaries of Catholicism; after all, the Jesuits 
could not easily criticize a woman who was helping to win more converts to the faith. 
Asceticism and Self-Mortification
For some women, simple conversion to Christianity, relocating to the missions, and 
assisting to convert others were not enough. Several women took their faith to an 
extreme, perhaps in search of a more personal relationship with God. These were de-
vout converts: one does not mortify her own flesh or expose herself to freezing water 
simply for the prospect of receiving an extra pound of maize or an extra blanket. It is 
clear that such material benefits did not solely motivate these women; they must have 
been moved by something much deeper.35
Father Dablon’s 1672 story of a woman who took responsibility for her daughter’s 
actions by inflicting punishment on herself is an example of one such devotee. The 
mother was so horrified to see her daughter talking to a man out in the field that “she 
took some small cords and made an instrument of discipline, like those that she had 
seen; and with this she beat her daughter when the latter rose the next morning.”36 
Her daughter cried out and asked her mother what she had done to deserve such 
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treatment. The mother then wept, saying, “Must I then be the mother of a girl con-
demned? Must it be that I have borne and reared a daughter for the demons, and for 
eternal companionship with them in the cruel flames of hell?” She then beat herself 
“so severely that she long bore its marks on her shoulders.”37 Without any prompting 
from a Jesuit priest, this woman prescribed her own corporal punishment, blaming 
herself for a perceived sin she had committed in raising her daughter badly. Another 
young woman “was so filled with contrition” over committing a sin that, “resolving to 
make immediate confession, she went away into the woods and took a severe discipline 
in expiation of her sin” without waiting to see a Jesuit priest first.38
Kateri Tekakwitha participated in and perhaps even originated an unusual move-
ment of religious asceticism and self-mortification in the mission at Kahnawake. After 
living at the mission for a few months, she and a friend sought out a native woman who 
had converted to Catholicism many years before. This friend, baptized Marie, had observed 
female Christian spiritualists and encouraged the young girls to isolate themselves within 
the mission, to live together, and to dress alike in order to build a community. The trio 
then took to confessing to each other, fasting, whipping each other, and mortifying their 
flesh.39 Father Claude Chauchetière, the Jesuit missionary at Kahnawake, mentioned the 
trio in his relation of 1682: “You will be pleased to hear from me respecting the austeri-
ties practiced by certain savage women . . . it will show you their fervor.”40 He explained 
that he did not know where the women learned about these penitential rituals, but he 
suggested that the French nuns in Montreal practiced similar exercises.41
As already noted, one form of ascetical practice was self-mortification, which 
Christian Indians seem to have picked up from the Jesuits themselves. Archaeologists 
have discovered remnants of an object left at Fort Saint Joseph that resembles a cilice, a 
device used in this practice. Researchers suggest that the device’s owner could have been a 
Jesuit priest, a Native American man or woman, or a French settler. The Spiritual Exercises, 
the Jesuit religious manual authored by Ignatius Loyola, the founder of the Jesuits, did 
not require members of the Society of Jesus to practice self-mortification. But if a Jesuit 
practiced penitence rituals under the guidance of a superior, the Society approved of the 
practice, as long as it was not excessive.42 Some Christian Indian women may have imitated 
Jesuit mentors in their practices of penance; others constructed their own ascetic rituals 
from their environment despite discouragement from the Jesuits. In the bleak winter of 
1676 an anonymous woman, pregnant at the time, removed all her clothing at the foot of 
a large cross in the mission cemetery. Two other women followed her example by making 
a hole in the frozen river and throwing themselves in, remaining submerged while they 
prayed a rosary. One of the women returned to her cabin without warming herself at all, 
lying down “on her mat with lumps of ice adhering to her shoulders.”43 
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The Jesuits approved of Native Americans’ use of asceticism as a tool for ex-
piating sin as long as the Fathers themselves prescribed the punishment and as long 
as the women used it in moderation. But the Jesuits soon questioned the women’s 
motivations, particularly after Kateri Tekakwitha’s death, when more women at the 
Kahnawake mission began to practice self-mortification without the direction of the 
Jesuits, and when their penitence rituals became more and more severe. At this point, 
the debate over penitence rituals in the mission became a power struggle between the 
Fathers and female converts, and some women even left the mission in order to be 
“mistresses of their own bodies.”44 
Of course we cannot know exactly what motivated these women to adopt such 
severe penitential practices, especially without any guidance from the Jesuit mission-
aries, but clearly they sought a more personal relationship with the Deity – one that 
was not exclusively mediated by a Jesuit priest or a Christian male of any sort. Therein 
lay an increased personal autonomy. Whatever the reason, some women took extreme 
measures that set their experience apart from others in the Christian missions with 
the effect, if not necessarily the intention, of creating an autonomous and unmediated 
relationship with God.
Conclusion
Identity empowerment theory outlines several distinct religious choices a woman must 
make in order to influence the quality of her everyday life. First, she must deliberately 
choose her religious beliefs rather than blindly follow traditions, cultural norms, or 
family traditions.45 Each of the women noted in this study chose to join a Christian 
mission for personal reasons, reasons that we will probably never fully know. This 
decision was a difficult one, as it meant leaving her family, friends, and way of life 
to subscribe to a completely foreign culture and religion. Second, she must choose 
the degree to which she will participate in her religion.46 Christian Indian women 
of New France practiced Christianity to varying degrees. Some made the decision 
to convert, moved to the mission, and never did much else that the Jesuits thought 
worthy of recording. Other women took on leadership roles in the community by 
teaching or converting other converts, translating for and advising the Jesuits, or 
punishing their children to teach them moral lessons. Still others adopted significant 
corporal austerities. 
To say that the Christian Indian women of missions in New France were 
feminists would be a blatant anachronism. But as this study shows, these women 
– inspired by motivations both spiritual and mundane – exercised their agency by 
stepping outside their traditional and perhaps even their new Europeanized gender 
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roles as envisaged by the Jesuits. Many women left their families to find a community 
that could better fulfill their spiritual or social needs. Others carved out leadership roles 
within those communities so that they could have a direct influence over others. A few 
exercised their autonomy to an even greater level without the direct mediation of the 
Jesuits and sought a direct (and sometimes painful) relationship with the divine. 
Despite the hierarchical and patriarchal nature of early modern Catholicism 
as taught by the Jesuits and by the French cultural model that both framed Jesuit 
thought and fueled missionary efforts in New France, some Christian Indian women 
actually found empowerment through their new religion. Through their roles as 
teachers, translators, advisors, disciplinarians, and practitioners of religious asceticism 
in various missions in New France, several women found in their new faith ways in 
which they could assert their own independence.
NOTES
1.  James Merrell, The Indians’ New World: Catawbas and Their Neighbors from European Contact Through 
the Era of Removal (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989). Although he deals with 
Catawba Indians in what would later become the Southeastern United States, Merrell’s concept applies to 
all Native American groups who came in contact with European colonials. Merrell argues that European 
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 “Were you entitled to an answer. . . . ”
General Anthony Wayne and Major William Campbell 
on the Banks of the Maumee
Sarah E. Miller
On 21 August 1794, Major William Campbell of the British Army and commander of Fort Miamis on the banks of the Maumee River sent the following message to 
General Anthony Wayne, a U.S. army commander in the Northwest Territory:
Sir: An army of the United States of America, said to be under your 
command, having taken post on the banks of the Miami [Maumee] 
for upwards of the last twenty-four hours, almost within the reach 
of the guns of this fort, being a post belonging to his Majesty the 
King of Great Britain, occupied by his Majesty’s troops, and which 
I have the honor to command, it becomes my duty to inform my-
self, as speedily as possible, in what light I am to view your making 
such near approaches to this garrison. I have no hesitation, on my 
part, to say, that I know of no war existing between Great Britain 
and America.1
According to well-mannered eighteenth-century etiquette, General Wayne replied:
Sir: I have received your letter of this date, requiring from me the 
motives which have moved the army under my command to the 
position they at present occupy, far within the acknowledged juris-
diction of the United States of America. Without questioning the 
authority or the propriety, sir, of your interrogatory, I think I may, 
without breach of decorum, observe to you, that, were you entitled 
to an answer, the most full and satisfactory one was announced to 
you from the muzzles of my small arms, yesterday morning, in the 
action against the horde of savages in the vicinity of your post, which 
terminated gloriously to the American arms; but, had it continued 
until the Indians, &c were driven under the influence of the post 
and guns you mention, they would not have much impeded the 
progress of the victorious army under my command, as no such post 
was established at the commencement of the present war between 
the Indians and the United States.2
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Major Campbell’s brazen letter neglected to mention, as Wayne pointed out, 
that the fort he occupied had been built earlier that year squarely on American soil 
for the purpose of supporting the Indians of the Northwest Territory, who were then 
at war with the United States. Despite the 1783 Treaty of Paris ending the American 
Revolution, Great Britain and the United States were still at odds, especially in the 
Ohio country. Confrontations between American settlers and Native Americans 
sponsored by the British had culminated in the Battle of Fallen Timbers fought the 
day before Campbell’s and Wayne’s initial exchange of letters. The Americans saw the 
British as instigators in the frontier violence, and tempers flared when Wayne’s Legion 
came across the new British fort situated on soil claimed by the United States through 
international treaty. 
The Battle of Fallen Timbers was a crucial stage in the struggle between the Na-
tive Americans of the Old Northwest Territory (Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and 
Wisconsin) and the newly-formed United States of America. At the end of the American 
Revolution signaled by the Treaty of Paris (1783), Great Britain had agreed to remove 
her military posts from the area. For various reasons, the British did not comply. In 
fact, in early 1794, an order from Guy Carleton –  at that time Lord Dorchester and 
Governor-in-Chief of the Canadas –  authorized the Lieutenant Governor of Upper 
Canada, John Graves Simcoe, to construct Fort Miamis along the Maumee River, 
plainly situating it on land accorded by treaty to the United States. American Secretary 
of State Edmund Randolph complained to British Ambassador George Hammond 
that the intrusion was “an act, the hostility of which cannot be palliated.”3  
The government of the United States had been struggling for control of the 
Northwest Territory since the end of the American Revolution. Although during the 
war the British had promised their Native American allies their own Indian buffer 
state, the Treaty of Paris (1783) did not even mention the Indians.  As a result, both 
the United States and the Indians believed the western lands to be theirs.  As early as 
1783, the Indians of the Northwest Territory met in council and agreed to negotiate as 
one unit when dealing with the United States.  The Iroquois of upper New York were 
instrumental in the early Confederacy. Other groups included the Shawnee, Miami, 
Wyandot, Ottawa, Delaware, and tribes generally referred to as the “Lake Indians” 
(indicating they lived around one or more of the Great Lakes).  During the last 150 
years, many of these tribes had been pushed from their homelands into what later 
became called the Northwest Territory. As the American settlers moved westward, 
the Indians’ homelands were again threatened. Some groups, notably the Iroquois, 
Delaware, and Wyandot, hoped to contain the encroachment of current and future 
settlers by establishing a new boundary between them and Native Americans. Indian 
53
The Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association 2011
groups that had not yet experienced westward displacement, such as the Shawnee 
and Miami, insisted on the Ohio River boundary established between the Indians 
and Great Britain at the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768.  Despite the best intentions, 
the Confederacy began to unravel almost immediately when the Iroquois signed the 
Second Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1784 wherein they gave up lands north and west of 
the Ohio River to the United States. Two other “conquest” treaties, of Fort McIntosh 
(1785) and of Fort Finney (1786), continued to divide the Confederacy because only 
a few tribes, or more precisely, a few men from a few tribes, signed the treaties.  Since 
the Confederacy as a whole had not consented to these treaties, many Indians felt 
that the entire Confederacy was not bound by them and thus continued to view the 
approach and settlement of Americans north and west of the Ohio River as a violation 
of the 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix.4
Three conquest treaties between the U.S. government and various Indian groups 
(Fort Stanwix in 1784, Fort McIntosh in 1785, and Fort Finney in 1786) did little to 
diminish violence in the territory. Clashes between American settlers and Indians con-
tinued. In 1789, the United States again tried to establish a territorial division between 
the Indians and the settlers with the Treaty of Fort Harmar. This treaty failed to meet the 
requirements of the Indians and few, if any, official spokesmen for the Confederacy signed 
the documents. Violence continued, and in 1790, the first of three American military 
forays advanced into the Northwest Territory. Commonly called Harmar’s Defeat, the 
Indians twice ambushed the force under General Josiah Harmar before he regrouped and 
returned to Cincinnati. The devastating so-called St. Clair’s Defeat, wherein Territorial 
Governor General Arthur St. Clair led a second expedition, occurred the following year 
and was the worst defeat hitherto of an American army. Nearly half of the entire force 
was killed in a surprise attack on the morning of 4 November 1791. The third attempt 
to chastise the Indians for depredations would be led by General Anthony Wayne, who 
received his military command in 1792. This experienced Indian fighter trained his 
army, now called the American Legion, for two years as he slowly advanced northward 
through the Ohio country, building forts and stockpiling supplies. 
The United States government felt that this military offensive against the Indi-
ans was necessary. Reports of violence on the frontier panicked western settlers and 
eastern investors. After two military defeats, the government was relying on Wayne. 
General Harmar wrote in late 1793 to Ebenezer Denny (an American officer in the 
First Regiment): “If General Wayne should be unsuccessful with this army (which I 
sincerely hope may not be the case), the frontier settlements on the Ohio must be left 
in a wretched exposed situation. The consequence would be dreadful indeed.”5 Expan-
sion of the new United States would surely be stalled by a third Indian victory.  
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In June 1794, the warriors of the Northwestern Indian Confederacy – primarily 
Shawnee and Miami, joined by some Ottawa, Pottawattamie, and Ojibwa – made an 
assault on the American Fort Recovery. Initially and successfully attacking a return-
ing supply caravan, the young warriors exuberantly then decided to assault the fort 
itself. After a long day of fighting with no sign of weakening the fort, the frustrated 
Indians retreated.  
In August 1794, Wayne and his men moved from Fort Greeneville to the Indian 
stronghold of the Glaize located at the confluence of the Auglaize and Maumee riv-
ers. The inhabitants fled as the American army approached. Wasting no time, Wayne 
ordered the construction of Fort Defiance to replace the Indian village. On 18 August, 
Wayne moved his fighting force to the Roche de Bout on the banks of the Maumee 
and built a small storage fort called Deposit. From there, Wayne and his men advanced 
against the warriors of the Northwest Indian Confederacy.6
On the morning of 20 August 1794, Wayne and his American Legion fought 
a short (forty-five minutes) battle against a portion of the Confederacy’s forces. The 
majority of the Indian warriors was not present at this Battle of Fallen Timbers, but 
had stayed behind in the village at Swan Creek because they did not anticipate battle 
on the rainy morning. As the defeated Indians evacuated the battlefield, the Legion 
fully believed they would regroup for another round. Captain John Cook wrote in his 
journal that “this affair . . .  does not deserve the name of battle.”7
As the Indians retreated, they approached the gates of Fort Miamis hoping for 
British support against Wayne’s army. For weeks leading up to the battle, the British 
had seemingly promised protection for the Indians, but when the latter needed it, 
Campbell closed and locked the gates of the fort upon hearing the sounds of battle. 
Campbell thus denied the Indians refuge in Fort Miamis. Angered and betrayed, they 
failed to reorganize and resist the Americans; instead they retreated to their camp at 
Swan Creek. Jonathon Adler, a white who had previously been captured and raised by 
the Indians, reported that “it was an act the Indians never forgot.”8 It is certain that the 
Indians expected assistance from the British at Fort Miamis. Joseph Brant, the famous 
Mohawk leader, later chastised the British for building Fort Miamis “under pretence of 
giving refuge in case of necessity but when that time came the gates were shut against 
them as enemies.”9 John Anderson, a British merchant at the fort, recalled that the 
following day “the Indians returned much enraged against the [British] officers, [call-
ing] them cowards, and in one instance spit in the face of a [lieutenant].”10 Years later, 
the Shawnee war-chief Blue Jacket remembered that “when we could not withstand 
the army that came against us . . . the English told us ‘I cannot let you in.  You are 
painted too much, my children.’ It was then we saw the British dealt treacherously 
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with us.”11 This immediate recognition of betrayal persisted, and the Indians of the 
Confederacy would never fully trust the British again.  How had they so disastrously 
miscalculated the situation?
Officials of the British Indian Department had indeed long encouraged and sup-
ported the Native Americans to resist the encroachment of the United States on lands 
north and west of the Ohio River. Shortly after the end of the American Revolution, 
British Major Arent DePeyster sent white wampum signifying peace to the Shawnee 
and Wyandot Indians. He told them not to “forget their promise to continue as firm 
as the oak and as deep as the waters, in the cause of the King of Great Britain.”12 The 
Indians understood this relationship to mean that the British were likewise willing to 
aid and protect them against armed intrusion of the United States. The British again 
encouraged Indian resistance when Matthew Elliott, a British Indian agent, tried in 
1785 to dissuade a group of Shawnee from attending the negotiation of the Treaty 
of Fort Finney. He asserted “that the Indians had better fight like men than give up 
their lands and starve like dogs.”13 British agents often lived among the Indians and 
had family relations there. While this allowed them to have firsthand knowledge of 
the frontier situation, they were also often removed from the making of “official” 
British policy. Immediate local need and general British diplomacy were sometimes in 
conflict with each other, and these local agents sometimes aided their Indian friends 
nonetheless.  
In 1790, Arthur St. Clair complained that British trader Alexander McKee, who 
was married to a Shawnee woman, was “distributing ammunition and stores [which] 
looks so like the support of the government that it is impossible they should view it 
in any other light.”14 Isaac Freeman, an American spy, reported in 1792 that British 
traders such as McKee and James Girty delivered goods to the chiefs at the Glaize, and 
in return, the chiefs flew the British flag over their homes.15 Officially, these supplies 
were to be used for hunting, but the volume of trade implied that they were also used 
in raids against the Americans.  
Official British policy after 1783 suggested that war between Great Britain and the 
United States was to be avoided, but a British proxy war using the Native Americans was 
nevertheless in full swing. It was this attitude that made the Indians believe that Great 
Britain was in fact an ally and would aid them against the American army. In August 
1792, Simcoe told McKee that it was “neither the Interest nor the Inclination of His 
Majesty’s Government to commence Offensive Hostilities against the United States.”16 
Nevertheless, that same year McKee subsequently delivered 100,000 pieces of wampum 
to the polyglot Indian village at the Glaize and 80 percent of it was black, signifying 
hostility.17 The Indians even received from Fort Miamis provisions for councils held 
56
The Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association 2011
during this time. To the Indians, all signs pointed to British support, perhaps only 
with a wink and a nod; but the Indians of the Northwest relied on it.
Despite what appeared to many to be obvious overtures, however, some Indians 
did express disbelief that the British would in fact aid them if the Americans attacked. 
Mohawk leader Joseph Brant tried to understand the precise relationship between Great 
Britain, the United States, and the Native Americans. In 1792, he asked McKee, “if 
Great Britain wishes us to defend our country, why not tell us so in plain language. 
If the reverse, let it be mentioned, then we will know how to act, and be enabled to 
take such steps as will secure us and our posterity.” Essentially, the Indians could only 
realistically defend their Ohio lands if the British guaranteed support for a war against 
the Americans. If Great Britain could not offer that, Brant implied that a treaty between 
the Indians and the United States might be necessary.18
In February 1794, Governor-in-Chief Carleton (or Lord Dorchester) announced 
that war between the United States and Great Britain was certain. When he even al-
luded to the development of an Indian state, the Native Americans latched onto this 
idea as a policy statement, especially since he had just returned to Canada from Britain 
during the previous year.19 That same month, British official Joseph Chew wrote a 
private letter to Thomas Aston Coffin in Quebec complaining that some Indians there 
had access to a pamphlet stating that war was expected between the United States 
and Great Britain.20 Two months later, Simcoe officially relayed that message to the 
Indians and British agents in the Ohio country.21 An April 1794 report from Fort 
Detroit, a British outpost, mentioned that Simcoe and several troop companies under 
the command of Colonel England had gone to build an outpost along the Maumee 
River. Before long this Fort Miamis was completed at the foot of the Maumee Rapids 
and was clearly upon American soil. Additionally, the British fortified Turtle Island in 
the mouth of the Maumee River and added troops along the River Raisin, both sites 
also on American soil.22 On 10 July 1794, Simcoe reported to McKee his belief that 
ongoing diplomatic negotiations to improve relations between Great Britain and the 
United States would be fruitless.23 British belief in an impending war prompted an 
increase in their encouragement of the Indians to attack frontier settlements.  
American beliefs about British complicity in frontier violence had been validated 
at the attack on Fort Recovery back in June 1794. In his correspondence to his superior, 
Lieutenant Governor Simcoe, McKee noted that although many British were present 
at the battle, they could not commit themselves. Had the British obviously “taken an 
active share in the contest [they would have] become at least auxiliaries in the war.”24 
Other reports, however, show that British agents, such as Simon Girty and McKee, 
did indeed fight with the Indians at Fort Recovery, even though the British govern-
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ment could give no official support to their actions.25 The Indians, however, made no 
distinction between their British friends and the British government and saw such acts 
of friendship as government-sanctioned. In May 1794, McKee had even told Joseph 
Chew that only the absence of a formal declaration of war deterred him from advancing 
British troops to aid the Indians. Even after the fighting at Fort Recovery, the British 
increased the amount of supplies intended for the Indians, especially gunpowder sent 
to Fort Miamis, a gesture the Indians considered akin to a British-Indian alliance.26
When Wayne’s army captured two Shawnee Indians in July 1794 and interro-
gated them about the British, they replied that some chiefs in council had refused to 
send warriors to battle because “they could not depend upon the British for effectual 
support; they were always setting the Indians on like dogs after game.”27 This informa-
tion came in conjunction with the capture of two Pottawattamies that same month, 
who informed Wayne that Simcoe was sending messages to encourage the Indians 
to fight the Americans. They reported that messages sent from Simcoe “were as red 
as blood; all the wampum and feathers were painted red; the war pipes and hatchets 
were red, and even the tobacco was painted red.” Contrary to the Shawnee’s lack of 
confidence in the British, the Pottawattamie believed that Simcoe would supply 1500 
men to support the Indians.28 In council in May 1794, the Delaware chiefs had told the 
British, in a message delivered to McKee, to “be strong and bid your children [British 
agents and troops] make haste to our assistance as was promised by them. We have 
been constantly calling upon them all the Spring to collect here to oppose this Enemy 
but hitherto to no purpose.”29 These statements reveal that the British had encouraged 
the Indians to fight, but neglected to commit to outright formal assistance.  
Even after the Battle of Fallen Timbers had routed Native American forces, some 
Indians still expected to get assistance at Fort Miamis. Although Great Britain had 
showed friendship towards the Indians and even supported them with words, weapons, 
and sometimes men in their opposition to American expansion, Campbell well knew 
that his force could not confront the Legion directly as it pushed the Native American 
warriors towards the fort. Admitting the Indians warriors into the protection of Fort 
Miamis would have given Wayne the pretext to attack the fort. This, in effect, would 
have started an Anglo-American war.
So Campbell had to rely on a confrontation by way of words in his first mes-
sage. Wayne and his men longed for a clash with the country that, in his eyes as well 
as in the opinion of most Americans, had encouraged the Indians to resist and attack 
American settlement north of the Ohio River. Thus Wayne and his men took this op-
portunity to antagonize the British. Bad feelings between the two armies grew as the 
Americans crept within range of the British guns. The British soldiers ached to fire on 
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the Americans who mocked them. John Anderson, who was among the former, recalled 
that the American troops “came within musket Shott [sic] of the fort, at which time 
artillery officers had the slow & quick matches burning and the Cannon well loded 
[sic] and request[ed] permeation [sic] to fire but the Maj[o]r Positively refused.”30  
After the initial exchange of notes, Major Campbell re-sharpened his quill:
Sir: Although your letter of yesterday’s date fully authorizes me to 
any act of hostility against the army of the United States of America 
in this neighborhood, under your command, yet, still, anxious to 
prevent that dreadful decision which, perhaps, is not intended to 
be appealed to by either of our countries, I have forborne, for those 
two days past, to resent those insults you have offered to the British 
flag flying at this fort, by approaching it within pistol shot of my 
works, not only singly, but in numbers, with arms in hands.31
This reaction eventually won accolades from Simcoe and other British officials when 
the correspondence was forwarded and received. Campbell’s stance, however, stemmed 
not only from the Americans’ daring approaches to the fort, but also a report from 
an American deserter. Campbell had intelligence that Wayne’s actual objective was 
Fort Miamis and that the American general had told his men “not to be uneasy about 
provisions, that there were plenty in the British garrison.”32 Campbell again mentioned 
the possibility of a general war when his note continued:
Neither is it my wish to wage war with individuals; but, should 
you, after this, continue to approach my post in the threatening 
manner you are at this moment doing, my indispensable duty to 
my King and country, and the honor of my profession, will oblige 
me to have recourse to those measures, which thousands of either 
nation may hereafter have cause to regret, and which, I solemnly 
appeal to God, I have used my utmost endeavors to arrest.33
Wayne and Campbell stood toe to toe with their venom-filled pens. Each man 
despised the position of the other. In the middle of unsettled territory, both men contem-
plated facing the other in battle. The Americans resented British support of the Indians and 
the very presence of a British fort located on American soil. The presence of Fort Miamis 
symbolized aid to the Indian Confederacy of the Northwest, the very Native Americans 
that the United States government was attempting to dominate and restrain.  
Although Wayne had been given orders to subdue and negotiate with the Indians, 
international relations were the purview of the diplomats of both governments. In fact, 
negotiations between the United States and Great Britain that would result in Jay’s Treaty 
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were ongoing at that time. Both Wayne and Campbell understood the possible diplomatic 
consequences if violence between the two nations erupted on the American frontier.  
After consideration of Campbell’s second note, Wayne opted to reply only to 
the first, thus changing the focus of the debate:
In your letter of 21st instant, you declare “I have no hesitation, 
on my part, to say, that I know of no war existing between Great 
Britain and America.” 
I, on my part, declare the same and that the only cause I have to 
entertain a contrary idea at present, is the hostile act you are now 
in commission of, i.e. by recently taking post far within the well 
known and acknowledged limits of the United States. This, sir, 
appears to be an act of the highest aggression, and destructive to 
the peace and interest of the Union.  Hence, it becomes my duty 
to desire, and I do hereby desire and demand, in the name of the 
President of the United States, that you immediately desist from 
any further act of hostility or aggression, by forbearing to fortify, 
and by withdrawing the troops, artillery, and stores, under your 
orders and direction, forthwith, and removing to the nearest post 
occupied by his Britannic majesty’s troops at the peace of 1783 
and which you will be permitted to do unmolested by the troops 
under my command.34
By insisting that Campbell remove his troops from Fort Miamis, Wayne could essentially 
win the battle of ink and accomplish his desire without resorting to physical violence. 
Wayne asserted that Fort Miamis was an illegal British fort, built after the completion of 
the Treaty of Paris on American soil, and he thus demanded that Campbell vacate it.
In reply, Campbell noted: 
I have at this moment the honor to acknowledge the receipt of 
your letter of this date, in answer to which I have only to say, be-
ing placed here in the command of the British post, and acting in 
military capacity only, I cannot enter into discussion, either on the 
right or impropriety of my occupying my present position. Those 
are matters that I conceive will be best left to the ambassadors of 
our different nations.35
Campbell skirted the question of legality ostensibly because diplomatic negotiations 
were outside of his purview. In fact, as he claimed, he was not permitted to evacuate 
the fort without orders from his superiors. With no orders to move, Campbell intended 
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to stay unless forcibly removed by the American army. Therefore he simply could not 
comply with Wayne’s request. He continued:
Having said this much, permit me to inform you, that I certainly 
will not abandon this post at the summons of any power whatever, 
until I receive orders to that purpose from those I have the honor 
to serve under, or the fortune of war should oblige me.
I must still adhere, sir, to the purport of my letter this morning, 
to desire that your army, or individuals belonging to it, will not 
approach within reach of my cannon, without expecting the con-
sequences attending it.36
The “consequences” that Campbell proclaimed would doubtlessly have been cannon 
shots fired at Wayne’s men and thus the possible outbreak of war.  He continued:
Although I have said, in the former part of my letter, that my situ-
ation here is totally military, yet, let me add, sir, that I am much 
deceived, if his Majesty, the King of Great Britain, had not a post 
on this river, at and prior to the period you mention.37
In effect, Campbell ended his letter denying Wayne’s territorial claim altogether. The 
fort, Campbell asserted, had been built on the site of a previous post, one that existed 
before the American Revolution. While it is not generally believed that a post existed 
on this site before 1794, Campbell may have been confused because previously other 
British forts had been located in the vicinity.38 At best, however, such a circumstance 
would hardly justify the recent construction of Fort Miamis in blatant disregard of 
the national boundaries set up in the Treaty of Paris. 
At this point, Campbell and Wayne had come to an impasse. Each side was irked 
by the other, but each was restrained by diplomacy. Wayne reported that this last letter 
was immediately set on fire. The Legion then commenced burning the fields and land 
around the fort, “even under the muzzles of the guns.” Wayne further observed that if 
Campbell had carried out his threats “he would have experienced a storm[ing]” by the 
American Legion.39  Mutual restraint saved the day. The tense situation on the banks 
of the Maumee in August 1794 diffused as Wayne continued to destroy the Indian’s 
crops along the river and moved away from Fort Miamis.  
General Anthony Wayne and Major William Campbell faced each other with 
animosity and perhaps hatred along the banks of the Maumee River.  Each man led 
an armed force willing, able, and eager to fight the other. Hostility flowed from their 
pens as they exchanged correspondence. In the end, however, both men recognized 
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that they were not duly appointed diplomats and – irrespective of the mutual antipathy 
–  their countries were officially at peace. Neither wanted to be accountable for the 
outbreak of an Anglo-American war in the wilds of the American frontier.40   
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“Just Plain Hard Work”: Shelby Cox Plemmons’ Life on a South 
Carolina Tobacco Farm
Matthew Roberts
Women were crucial to tobacco production. . . . They weeded plant 
beds, chopped weeds in the fields, wormed, topped, and suckered 
tobacco plants, and worked at the scaffold to hand, string, and 
pass sticks of tobacco into the barn.  They also handled their own 
household duties, cared for their families, and cooked for a large 
crew of workers.1      
Shelby Cox Plemmons was born in the years just before the Second World War. She grew up in a typical southern white farm family in a small town that could have 
been any small town in the rural South. Cox’s father was a tobacco farmer.  Southern 
tobacco farmers in the middle of the twentieth-century had to endure a yearlong process 
of intensive labor to produce a crop to sell.2 Tobacco farming was largely unmechanized 
and required nearly all the work to be done by hand.3 By necessity, families were large, 
and they relied on every family member’s labor to keep costs down.4 It was a world 
of contradiction where blacks and whites worked together out of mutual need but 
remained segregated in schools and in town.  It was a male-dominated culture where 
women were relegated to work and behavior was defined by strict gender roles.5  
This paper draws on an extensive interview with Shelby and highlights the im-
portant role of women in agricultural production. Farm women in the middle of the 
twentieth-century, like Shelby and her mother, received little credit for the crucial tasks 
they were responsible for on the farm. All the tasks typically identified with housework 
were the responsibility of farm women. Throughout the growing season, women were 
required to work in the fields, doubling up their responsibilities.  Not only did the 
patriarchal society make women conform to certain jobs, it also dictated how they had 
to conduct themselves in public and what liberties they could enjoy. The study of one 
farm woman’s experiences and memories can help acknowledge the contributions of 
the many women that toiled in the shadow of their husbands and brothers on rural 
farms across the South. Advances in technology and changes in government programs 
during the twentieth century brought about the demise of many family farms. Their 
loss could mean that without oral histories, like Shelby’s, women’s contributions to 
farm labor could be forgotten by future generations. This paper expands the growing 
body of social history that examines the roles of women and twentieth-century farm 
labor in the South.   
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Shelby grew up on a tobacco farm in Horry County, South Carolina, about a mile 
outside Loris.6 She was part of a large family and one of ten children.7 It was not unusual 
for families to be as large as hers. A 1920s study showed that farm families averaged 
5.5 children.8 As in most rural families, she and her siblings learned to work when they 
were young. Shelby recalled that “if you could walk, you could work.”9 If the children 
were too young to work in the fields, they would help prepare the meals by doing tasks 
like shelling beans or peas.10 The labor was so intense that no matter how successful a 
tobacco farmer might become, the children always worked on the farm.11 
The process for cultivating a crop of tobacco began in January with the sowing 
of the seed. The sowing was done by hand on the Cox farm until the late 1950s, when 
Shelby’s family began to mechanize the process by purchasing machines and tractors.12 
In waiting to mechanize, they were fairly typical - most tobacco farmers across the 
South relied on hand labor until the 1960s.13 When Shelby was older, the family began 
using weed-killing chemicals, but before that, the entire family would help weed the 
crop throughout the growing season.14 The summer was the busiest time on the farm, 
for that was when the tobacco harvesting and curing took place.15 The tobacco was 
so important that the family would store it inside the house after it was  harvested 
and cured. Her mother “would take down the beds . . . and stand all the bed frames 
outside.”16 “We’d just put the mattresses down anywhere we could find . . . and they’d 
put the tobacco in the house.”17 All summer, the family would sleep on palettes in the 
long hall down the center of the house. Later, Shelby’s father built a pack house to 
store both their tobacco and the tenants’ tobacco.18 Curing the tobacco also required 
everyone to help out. Tobacco would be cured in barns that were heated by flues.19 A 
large wood fire in a brick fireplace was used to sustain the heat.20 It would require three 
or four days of constant work to cure the tobacco. During that time, family members 
would take turns staying up all night maintaining the fire. It was also a time when the 
family and the tenants would “roast a chicken or something else . . . [and] . . . have 
them a little party.”21 In autumn, the work would turn to creating hands of tobacco 
and grading it, “We’d separate the leaves into piles and we’d have about three of four 
different grades.”22 After grading, the tobacco was bundled together onto sticks and 
taken to the warehouse to be sold.23 It required over 257 hours of work to cultivate 
one acre of tobacco crop.24 Tobacco was “your livelihood” and the most important 
thing in a farmer’s life.25   
Land owners like Shelby’s father would also use tenant farmers to do some of 
the work.  Tenants were supplied with a home and a plot of land and expected to 
work the land and then split the crop with the land owner at the end of the season.26 
Shelby’s family had about four or five tenant families who lived on the family land, 
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helped with the tobacco production, and shared the profit.27 Shelby recalls that ten-
ants on the Cox farm enjoyed working for her father, which wasn’t always the case on 
neighboring farms. Shelby’s father had a reputation among the locals as being both 
kind and an excellent farmer.  Some of the tenants were African American, and they 
worked side by side with the white families.28 This was not unusual for the time, for 
when conditions such as working on a farm dictated, racial differences were often 
ignored.29 Historian Pete Daniel writes that the process of  “barning tobacco brought 
family, neighbors, owners, tenants, sharecroppers, black, white, young, old, men and 
women together. They shared gossip, news, sweat, fatigue, Pepsi-Colas, Moon Pies, and 
meals.”30 It was much the same on the Cox family farm, but aside from work, Shelby 
and her family had little contact with African Americans. She attended segregated 
schools, and although her parents stressed treating African Americans with respect, the 
family avoided the areas of town where they lived and did not “mingle with them.”31 
Later in life, Shelby and her husband allowed an African American friend of their 
oldest son to live with them for close to a year, even though a few people in the com-
munity privately expressed disapproval. Her willingness to open up her home despite 
criticism is a reflection of the values her parents taught her as the family worked side 
by side with African Americans, “my Dad didn’t treat [blacks] any different” and “we 
were taught to be respectful.”32
Though tobacco was the most important crop, it was not the only one that 
Shelby and her family grew. A 1926 United States Department of Agriculture study 
showed that southern farm families grew 66 percent of their own food, and Shelby’s 
family was no different.33 They grew sweet potatoes and “banked them” for use all 
winter.34 In the summer months, they kept a garden, where they cultivated “ a lot 
of collards, cabbage, and turnip greens” and stored them for use all year.35 On the 
farm they also raised chickens, pigs, and cattle. Food was plentiful, if not a little dull. 
Shelby remembers it as a big treat when her father would bring home bologna, hot 
dogs, or ice cream.36 
The work done in the fields was not the only labor performed on the farm. Tasks 
typically identified with housework like cooking and cleaning were the responsibility 
of farm women.37 Shelby, her two sisters, and her mother were responsible for doing 
all the cooking and cleaning.38 Shelby learned to cook at an early age and also had to 
do the ironing and sweep the yard, which was kept free of grass all summer.39 Only one 
of her seven brothers helped with washing clothes, and he was embarrassed enough 
by that work to hide when his girlfriend came to see him.40 Like many rural families 
who lacked running water, Shelby’s mother would wake before everyone else to prepare 
breakfast on a wood stove. On Sunday she would stay home from church services so 
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she could cook the family dinner.41 Dinners were mid-day meals, and Shelby’s mother 
would cook for all the people who worked on the farm because “if you worked helping 
Daddy, you ate dinner with us.”42 It wasn’t until Shelby was a teenager that her father 
remodeled the house and added a bathroom and gas stove, making household tasks 
easier.43 In the evenings, the girls were also required to help with tasks associated with 
field work like preparing tobacco for shipment to the warehouse or shelling corn for 
seed.44 It meant not only that they they had to attend school or work during the day in 
the household, but also that they were required to work in the evening too, doubling 
up their responsibilities. During the sowing or weeding of the crop, the girls might 
also be required to work in the fields as well.  
Throughout her childhood, Shelby was assigned jobs based on her gender. When 
the girls were at home helping with the seed corn, the boys “dressed up and went to 
town” for a night out.45 During the summer months when the girls would return from 
harvesting, they would be required to help their mother prepare the meal, while the 
boys were allowed to “lay down on the porch and rest awhile.”46 Shelby remembers 
being told that the boys were able to rest because “they were boys and they had harder 
work to do than girls.”47 This favoritism toward males included Shelby and her sisters 
being told when they were young that girls wouldn’t be allowed to inherit a share of the 
family farm because they might “marry some ole scalawag” who would snatch away the 
land.48 Sometimes the adults would belittle the work of the girls. Once, after cleaning 
some fish for the family, Shelby and her sister overheard her aunt telling someone that 
the fish were “so clean” that “them boys must have cleaned them.”49  
Not only did the patriarchal society make her perform certain jobs, it dictated 
her behavior by restricting her choice of clothing and even who could drive an auto-
mobile. Until Shelby’s youngest sister was older, their father did not allow the girls 
to wear shorts. She remembers as a teenager buying a pretty pair of Bermuda shorts 
while in town by herself.  Knowing that her father would have the final decision on 
the appropriateness of the new shorts, she put them on and tried to sneak home on 
a route she hoped he wouldn’t be traveling that day. Unfortunately, her father came 
that way and caught Shelby in the new bermuda shorts. She had to ride home sitting 
next to him, and although he surprised her by not objecting to the new shorts then, 
she was told later to return them. Driving, too,  was something that only her father 
and brothers did. Shelby and her sisters always walked to town or were driven by their 
father. Shelby did not learn how to drive until 1972, after her third child was born, 
and she could never recall when, as a child, she had ever seen a woman driving.50
Amidst all the work, the children still had “a lot of time to play,” not with “bought 
toys” but with items found around the farm like tin cans and blocks of wood.51 When 
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the weather was good, ball games were popular pasttimes for both the older and younger 
children. Rainy days were often spent together playing games like marbles on the huge 
wrap-around porch of the family home. During the growing season, the children both 
worked and played outside, something Shelby believes helped make them healthier than 
today’s young people. When the weather didn’t allow them to work or play outdoors, 
the family would gather in the “fire room” and listen to radio programs like the Lone 
Ranger and the Squeaking Door.52 People also gathered together to watch television, 
but it was a controversial new technology. When television first came to the area, 
ministers labeled it the “devil’s horns” after the antenna that were raised on farmhouse 
roofs.53 Watching television was considered “very sinful;” it was condemned by local 
stump preachers, and it was openly discouraged by people in the community.54 Slowly 
people gave in to progress, and televisions became common. Shelby remembers that 
her father had no problem with television, but he still waited until after she left for 
college in the mid-1950s before getting one for the family.  
Faith was an important influence in the lives of the local farmers, and they 
gathered together to worship when not working in the fields. Shelby’s father would 
load up his pick-up truck on Sunday mornings and then again that evening with 
anyone that wanted to go to church.  “Hell and damnation” was the frequent message 
preached from the pulpit,55 but church gatherings could also mean community parties 
with cake, ice cream, and children’s games. Summertime brought tent meetings with 
lots “of shoutin,” as did meetings at the homes of sick church members.56 Faith and 
community were central to the way of life on a tobacco farm and reinforced the gender 
roles of men and women. In Shelby’s family, as peviously mentioned, her mother was 
usually the only member to miss morning services, not because she didn’t want to 
attend, but because she had to prepare the Sunday dinner.57
After graduating from high school in 1956, Shelby left the farm to attend Ander-
son Junior College.58 Although she continued to return home to visit, she subsequently 
moved to Spartanburg, where she has lived for fifty years.59 After her father died, she 
and her sisters were given an acre of land apiece, and the rest was passed down to her 
brothers. Eventually, however, the farm became a victim of the government’s declining 
tobacco allotment program - which, for decades, had provided an incentive to farmers 
to reduce production - and stopped producing tobacco. 60 
For years, her father and then her brothers had relied on the government program 
that limited the amount of tobacco they could sell, but guaranteed a price for their 
price for their allotment. Each year, the government would measure their tobacco fields, 
would require them to cut down any excess acreage, and would  guarantee a minimum 
price for what remained. This allowed a small farm to survive while producing a small 
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crop. When bulk curers became available and larger farms mechanized, the small pro-
ducer began to be squeezed out of the market.61 The government made the situation 
worse by changing the allotment calculation from acres produced to poundage, making 
it difficult for farmers to predict what they would receive from the government.62 By 
1979, 61 percent of all tobacco growers were using bulk curers rather than the old barn 
cured method.63 Innovations like the mechanical harvester were affordable only by 
large-scale farms and left smaller farms unable to compete with the increased output.64 
Small farms, confronted with these changes to the allotment and the rising costs of 
new technology, were forced to close.65 In Shelby’s family, only one brother carried 
on the farming tradition, but faced with the unstable allotment and his approaching 
retirement, he, too, left farming.66 Long before that, most of the brothers had left the 
farm either to get local jobs or to open their own businesses.67 One brother  opened a 
local gas station and another opened a restaurant. It was common for local industries 
to absorb workers from farms as they closed, and Horry County was no different.68 
Because her brothers and sisters were hired locally, the family has been able to remain 
in the area.69 The land has now been divided up among the grandchildren and is cov-
ered over with their homes. Today, it is affectionally known to locals as “Cox Town.”70 
The Cox farm became yet another small-town farm to cease production because of 
declining profits, competition from large growers, and failed government programs. 
In an ironic twist, most of the sons who inherited the land had daughters who now 
own the family land. It has yet to fall into the hands of a “scalawag.”71
Though the Cox family farm is gone, as such, a microcosm of it exists nestled 
among the legions of growing hotels and restaurants on the west side of Spartanburg, 
South Carolina. Just off of South Blackstock Road, Shelby and her husband have 
operated a nursery since 1967.72 Before moving out into the “country” and beginning 
this now-thriving family business, called Plemmons Westview Greenhouses, she and 
her husband lived in downown Spartanburg, where she worked for several years as 
a drugstore clerk for twenty-two dollars.73 What began as just one small greenhouse 
and a couple of tomato beds has evolved into a business with more than a half-dozen 
greenhouses on two different pieces of property. Throughout the year, the family sells 
all types of annuals including pansies, impatiens, and petunias. The business is well 
known locally for its hanging baskets, flowering cabbage, and vegetable plants.74 Today, 
her youngest son, Chuck, works with them, operating his own business on the same 
location. Like his parents, he has become known in the area for his well-grown peren-
nials and hostas.75 During the busier times of the year, other family members are always 
there helping out around the greenhouses.76 If you stop in just about any time of year 
you will find Shelby hard at work. She cooks a large dinner almost every day, and she 
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welcomes to her table anyone who works there or just happens to be visiting. When 
she isn’t running the household, you’ll find her working in one of the greenhouses 
preparing the next crop of flowers, or on a busy day she might even be under the big 
tree helping customers. Like her mother and the other wives of tobacco farmers she 
knew growing up, she gets little credit for the success of the nursery business. To the 
public and even to reporters who have written features on the greenhouses for the local 
newspaper, it appears that her husband is the primary reason for their success. Those 
who take a closer look, however, can see that it is she who is “the real horticulturist” 
and the heart of the family.77 Shelby may have left the farm, but she brought the work 
ethic with her and has passed it on to her children and grandchildren. She is happiest 
when she is working the way she was taught to work long ago on the tobacco farm.
“My mother told me some years before she died, “Shelby you work too hard.” 
I said, “Mama it’s all your fault,” and she looked at me real funny, and she said “Why 
is it my fault?” I said “that is the way you and Dad taught us.”78
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Undertakers of the Weimar Republic? The Nazification of Munich 
Professors, 1918–1933
Stefan W. Wiecki
The ease with which Adolf Hitler discarded the essential elements of Germany’s first democracy, the Weimar Republic (1919–1933), in the years following his 
rise to power in 1933 has often confounded historians who expected acts of resolute 
resistance from the educated German elite against Hitler’s authoritarian ambitions. 
Yet even the most educated members of German society, the university professors, 
kept quiet and did not seem to mind the end of the liberal Weimar order. As early 
as 1948, historians had questioned the argument that Hitler alone was to blame for 
Weimar’s demise and had wondered whether the lack of elite support had doomed the 
first German democratic experiment from the start. Some scholars have subsequently 
argued that the German professors’ active rejection of the Weimar Republic made 
them partly responsible for both the fall of the first German democracy and the rise 
of Hitler in 1933.1  The fact that the majority of German professors rushed to offer 
Hitler their unsolicited support soon after he became chancellor in January 1933 
seems to confirm this thesis. To these historians, this public show of support proves 
that German academia had become infected with Nazi ideology long before the fall of 
the Weimar Republic. It was unsurprising, they noted, that German professors sided 
with Hitler, for this public act simply made official their allegedly long-held personal 
beliefs.2 This provocative argument, however, disregards the great variety of responses 
by German professors towards Nazism and obscures the counter-assertion, namely, 
that German academia was not committed to Nazi ideology before 1933. This study 
proposes to look at the complex responses of Munich professors to Nazism throughout 
the Weimar Republic. Rather than being “closet-Nazis” all along, the large majority of 
Munich professors subscribed to their own brand of nationalist conservative ideology 
that was in many ways as remote from democracy as it was from Nazism. To prove 
this thesis, let us first review the political convictions among German academics in 
general and then turn to the specific case of Munich University.  
Three groups of then-contemporary German scholars can be discerned when 
one gauges their views regarding the Weimar Republic: the “modernist” minority of 
Weimar supporters, the “orthodox majority” of Weimar skeptics, and the extreme 
German nationalists, who regarded democracy as a foreign concept. The “modernist” 
liberal and socialist professors who embraced the new democratic system remained a 
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relatively small group of social outsiders throughout the entire Weimar era, and even 
their support for the new republic was often based on reason rather than on emotional 
affirmation.3 By the early 1930s, their already small numbers had dwindled to almost 
nothing because the growing evidence of Weimar’s many deficiencies had become 
so glaringly obvious that even democrats were loath to defend the republic openly. 
In addition, many pro-Weimar educators grew fearful of becoming the target of the 
increasingly radicalized student body “that became at first a more and more nationalist-
völkisch, and then, even more vehemently, a National Socialist force and avant-garde 
that put tremendous pressure onto the university.”4
On the other side of the political spectrum from the “modernists” was the small, 
but vocal group of extreme German nationalists who did not accept the German defeat 
in the Great War and fiercely opposed the Weimar Republic. They regarded democracy 
not as a genuine German concept, but as an alien notion that had been imposed upon 
the defeated nation by the Entente powers to keep Germany weak and submissive. 
Making matters worse, the new republic seemed to them a socialist experiment because 
the first president, Friedrich Ebert, was a Social Democrat.5 Adding to the national-
ist professors’ alienation from the new Weimar state were the political upheavals of 
the immediate post-war period, such as Weimar’s acceptance of the Versailles Peace 
Treaty, the Spartacist uprising, and the Kapp Putsch. To the professors, these episodes 
revealed the republic’s inherent weakness and inability to assert its authority in both 
the domestic and international arenas. The nationalist professors’ goal was to restore 
the old monarchical system or at least to establish a conservative authoritarian state. 
They were, therefore, very much relieved when President Ebert died in 1925 and was 
replaced by the former Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, a nationalist-conservative 
figure and symbol of the old imperial order.6 
The orthodox majority of professors, which in this case was akin to a silent 
majority, considered themselves German patriots; their political preferences ranged 
from “liberal-conservative to German nationalist.”7 Unlike their extreme national-
ist colleagues, they did not try to fight or to destroy the Weimar system. Historian 
Helmut Heiber notes that while they neither loved nor hated the Weimar Republic, 
“they observed political events with the coolest skepticism.”8 Only a few of them 
joined political parties, and they excused their obvious lack of enthusiasm for the new 
democratic order by pointing out that they merely adhered to the Humboldtian ideal 
of an un-political scholarly profession.9 
Yet contrary to their professed “un-political” pretensions, the mindset of the 
majority of the educational elite was clearly anti-democratic, anti-socialist, and often 
also anti-Semitic – and thereby clearly opposed to the very foundations of the Weimar 
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Republic.10 To Heiber, there was little difference between the conservative majority 
and the extreme German nationalists: 
The great majority of the “party of party-less,” the allegedly “un-
political” [professors], had a political outlook that was very similar 
to that of their vociferous German nationalist colleagues – the 
only difference was [that the “moderates” were] more reserved, 
rather passive, and were politically perhaps half-a-step closer to 
the middle.11
It would be wrong to assume, however, that German professors never developed 
a positive relationship with the republic because of their perceptions of its actual or 
supposed shortcomings.  Instead, one could argue that the anti-democratic mindset 
of the majority of professors is to blame. Both the more moderate conservative and 
the extreme nationalist scholars remained wedded to the bygone era and were unable 
to overcome the downfall of the German Empire. Or, as Helmut Böhm argues, 
The majority of university teachers could not and would not estab-
lish a positive relationship with the Weimar state, because a back-
ward looking mentality prevailed, which combined the nostalgic 
memory of the old Imperial Germany with the wish for a national 
resurgence, a restoration of former greatness.12 
The attitudes of Munich professors towards Imperial Germany and the Weimar 
Republic reflected in many ways the mindset in German academia as a whole. There, 
too, the nationalistic spirit and the rejection of any kind of compromise peace prevailed 
throughout the First World War. Any kind of dissent was unacceptable and was seen as 
treason. For example, when Munich Professor Wilhelm Foerster published a pacifist news-
paper article in 1916 that criticized the conduct of the war and the imperial government, 
his Munich colleagues distanced themselves from him and student unrest broke out.13
Most Munich university faculty stood firmly behind the German war effort and 
the imperial government. The historian Karl Alexander von Müller (1882–1964) was 
one of the nationalist professors who, in 1917, joined the first German right-wing mass 
party, the Vaterlandspartei (Fatherland Party),14 which was strongly anti-socialist, sup-
ported annexationist war aims, and firmly rejected the proposed peace initiative of the 
Reichstag majority of 1917.15 At the helm of the Vaterlandspartei stood right-wing figures 
such as Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, journalist Wolfgang Kapp, and the businessman 
Alfred Hugenberg. Given the nationalistic spirit of the Vaterlandspartei, it comes as no 
surprise that Anton Drexler, later the founder of the German Workers’ Party (Deutsche 
Arbeiterpartei or DAP), the precursor of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party, 
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(Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei or NSDAP or Nazis), was another Munich 
resident who joined the Vaterlandspartei in the same year as von Müller.16 
While the Vaterlandspartei dissolved itself after the German defeat in 1918, its 
nationalistic spirit lived on in the minds of many former members. These national-
ists grew very worried by the various coup attempts and political assassinations that 
occurred in the early years of the Weimar Republic. The political insecurity of the 
post-war period was even more pronounced in Munich than it was in Berlin. To the 
overwhelming applause of the Munich conservative establishment, the right-wing ex-
tremist Count Anton von Arco-Valley assassinated the Independent Socialist Bavarian 
Minister President Kurt Eisner on 2 February 1919 as the latter was about to resign 
office.17 Two months after Eisner’s death, a Bolshevik coup established the Munich 
Räterepublik or Bavarian Soviet Republic. The conservative middle-class in Munich 
was in shock, and many prominent members of the political Right left the city in a 
hurry. Richard Willstätter, a Munich chemistry professor and Nobel Prize winner of 
1915, described the reaction of Munich professors to the coup in his memoirs: 
The university was in a panic. Some young troublemakers, male and 
female students, took the keys to the archives from the department 
chairs. They threatened the university and accused them of having 
lost touch with the Zeitgeist and the demands of the street. Some of 
my colleagues were personally threatened. Some of the professors 
who stood politically on the right had hastily fled the city.18
The professors’ fear that the Communists would try to destroy the traditional 
structures of Munich University proved warranted. During its short lifespan, the leaders 
of the Soviet Republic worked on an action program to “revolutionize the university” 
and transform it into a “people’s university.” They dispersed the university senate, 
took the rector hostage, and even instituted a two week experiment of a “proletarian 
transition-university.”19 
The radical transformation did not last long, however, because on 1 May 1919 the 
Räterepublik was bloodily crushed by right-wing Free Corps under General Franz Ritter 
von Epp.20 The conservative establishment in Munich, including most professors, breathed 
a sigh of relief at the apparent end of the Communist threat. Not surprisingly, the “Red 
Scare” caused by the short-lived Räterepublik further increased the anti-socialism of the 
Munich middle-class and its willingness to accept violent measures to suppress any Com-
munist threat in the future. As many of the leading figures of the Räterepublik had been 
of Jewish heritage, Munich was swept by a wave of anti-Semitism that focused specifically 
on the negative image of the “Jewish Bolshevist.”21 In the following years, Munich became 
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the focal point of intense anti-Semitic agitation and of the struggle against Communism. 
Munich seemed therefore predestined to become the starting point for Adolf Hitler’s 
political career, and Munich University had the doubtful honor of launching it. 
As Bolshevik agitation continued in 1919 among Bavarian soldiers waiting for 
their demobilization, the Press and Propaganda Section of the Reichswehr established in 
Bavaria a subordinate propaganda unit to counter the spread of Communist ideology. 
Historian Ian Kershaw states that among the Reichswehr leadership, the education of 
the troops in a “correct” anti-Bolshevik, nationalist fashion was rapidly regarded as 
priority, and “speaker-courses” were devised in order to train “suitable personalities 
from the troops,” who would remain for some considerable time in the army and func-
tion as “Propagandaleute” (propaganda agents) with qualities of persuasion capable of 
negating subversive ideas.22 General Staff officer Captain Karl Mayr, the commander 
of this subordinate Reichswehr propaganda unit, handpicked his former schoolmate 
Professor Karl Alexander von Müller in June 1919 as one of the Munich University 
instructors who should teach the so-called “Aufklärungskurse,” or political education 
courses, for Mayr’s propaganda unit.23 
One of the propaganda soldiers sitting in on Professor von Müller’s course on 
“Die politische Geschichte des Krieges” (“The Political History of the [Great] War) was 
Private Adolf Hitler, who dazzled his instructor with his exceptional oratorical talent.24 
After von Müller pointed out Hitler’s “natural rhetorical talent” to Mayr,25 the captain 
started assigning important propaganda tasks to the young private and thereby began 
Hitler’s political career. “He had advanced from being a course participant and mem-
ber of the propaganda unit to Mayr’s personal political assistant,”26 observed German 
historian Ernst Deuerlein. In November 1919, Mayr sent Hitler as an army V-Mann 
(Vertrauens-Mann or informer) to Anton Drexler’s newly formed DAP. Hitler joined the 
party while he was still a member of the Reichswehr and soon became its most coveted 
public speaker. He spoke on numerous occasions about the devastating political and 
economic effects of the Versailles Treaty, and he left no doubt that he regarded the Jews 
as the reason for Germany’s defeat in the war and her continuing weakness.27 
Hitler’s anti-Semitism and political outlook were, of course, not formed by sit-
ting in on Professor von Müller’s lecture course in June 1919, but it can be assumed 
that many of his ideas were confirmed by the prestigious historian, who thereby gave 
them his seal of approval.28 Through Professor von Müller, Munich University had 
unknowingly participated in the creation of Hitler the politician.29 
Given his own conservative nationalist background and his early fascination 
with Hitler, it is not surprising that von Müller developed sympathies for the Nazi 
movement early in the Weimar years. What is surprising, however, is that very few of 
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his colleagues shared his affinity for Nazism.30 One historian, Helmut Böhm, notes 
that Nazi ideology remained essentially “foreign” (“fremd”) to the majority of Munich 
professors, even though some could discern certain “positive aspects” (“positive Aspe-
kte”).31 It is telling that none of the tenured professors at Munich University joined 
the Nazi Party before 1933 – and this included von Müller as well.32 While some of 
the non-tenured faculty members, such as lecturers and assistant professors, joined the 
Party, even they chose to avoid displaying their political sympathies openly.33  
While most Munich professors were not members of any political party, the 
majority stood politically close to one of the three conservative groups: the Bayerische 
Volkspartei or Bavarian People’s Party (BVP), the Deutschnationale Volkspartei or German 
Nationalist People’s Party (DNVP), and the Deutsche Volkspartei or German People’s 
Party (DVP).34  The fact that the conservative BVP dominated Bavarian politics insu-
lated Munich University to a certain degree from the widely disdained federal govern-
ment in Berlin. As a result, the political attitude of Munich professors was less hostile 
to democracy than that of their colleagues at other German universities. According to 
Böhm, Munich University was unique in that “the nationalist attitude of the majority 
of professors was seldom harsh or aggressive and never radically articulated – especially 
in the last years of the republic, [the university] was despite all its misgivings [towards 
Weimar] concerned with the mitigation of tensions.”35 
This relative moderation did not mean, however, that the professors would go 
as far as to embrace the new democratic order. Like the professors of other German 
universities, the Munich professoriate also never declared itself openly in favor of the 
Weimar Republic. While the university administration usually tried to temper or to 
even suppress radical political tirades and direct attacks against the Weimar government 
at student-organized Vaterländische Kundgebungen (patriotic rallies),36 the university at 
the same time conspicuously avoided celebrating the Weimar Constitution or displaying 
the colors of the republic.37 Instead, Munich professors and students attended in droves 
the yearly Reichsgründungsfeier, the patriotic commemoration of the foundation of the 
Second German Reich that rekindled nationalist nostalgia for the old political order 
and further strengthened the reservation against the current democratic state.38 
Despite of the prevalence of antipathy to Weimar among their colleagues, a 
small group of liberal professors took a stand for their beliefs in the late 1920s. At 
the Reichsgründungsfeier in 1927, Rector Karl Vossler ordered the Weimar colors to 
be used and refused to give preferential treatment to the attending Bavarian Crown 
Prince Rupprecht – both actions a clear affront to his Weimar-skeptic colleagues. 
Vossler also invited the Jewish fraternities to attend the celebration in defiance of the 
public demands of Nazi-influenced Studentenschaft (student union) to exclude them. 
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Not surprisingly, many students and even some professors boycotted the event. In a 
politically courageous and far-sighted speech, Vossler then openly criticized the stu-
dents’ fanatical adherence to Nazi ideology and stated that university life had to be a 
reflection of the whole country and not just of one political group.39 Vossler’s support 
for the unpopular Weimar order and his audacious stand against the ambient extrem-
ism were widely covered in the press, but his action remained a unique event because 
the majority of professors did not subsequently take up his call. 
Unlike Vossler and the minority of liberal professors, the majority of conserva-
tive professors showed much more sympathy for the cause of the Nazi students. This 
is not to say, however, that they approved of their methods. For example, Pedagogy 
Professor Eduard Spranger gave voice to the widespread opinion among conservative 
professors that the Nazi student movement was in its outward appearance “undisci-
plined,” but “true” in its core.40 
How far the conservatives were from truly understanding Nazi radicalism, how-
ever, is clear from the reminiscences of Professor Artur Kutscher, who taught theater 
studies at Munich University between 1907 and 1951. In his memoirs, he recounts 
that he was impressed in late 1926 by the fact that an increasing number of “respectable 
people” at the university spoke in favor of Hitler’s political program.41 Kutscher admits 
that the social and nationalist aspects of Hitler’s program intrigued him as well: 
I valued Hitler’s fight against the egoism of the wealthy, his ap-
peal to a feeling and spirit of community, the individual sacrifice 
for the common good, his attempt to instill Marxist workers 
with nationalist spirit, his desire to unite Austria with Germany. 
Certainly, the negative sides could not be denied: the increasing 
uniformity of German life, the tendency to isolate the youth from 
their parents, the denial of God, the subjugation of the individual, 
the all-pervasive power of the party that reached even into the most 
private matters, the ‘education’ of the youth by leaders who were 
often insufficiently educated: we perceived all of this, but most of 
us overlooked it because of national and social goals [that Hitler 
promised to achieve] had more importance.42 
While Kutscher cast himself in his memoir as a left-leaning liberal and philo-
Semite, this picture does not necessarily reflect his real stance at the time. Fritz Franz 
Rosenthal, one of Kutscher’s students between 1931 and 1934, described his teacher as 
authoritarian and a “typical German nationalist,”43 who had his reservations about the 
Jews and used to say about them: “The Jews are always a little smarter than everyone 
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else.”44 His nationalist attitude and arguably latent anti-Semitism would explain why 
Kutscher, like so many other German nationalists, found it easy enough to go along 
with Nazism in 1933 despite certain misgivings.  
While latent anti-Semitism was a relatively common phenomenon at Munich 
University even before the Great War,45 by the early 1920s Jewish professors faced 
increasing hostility of an entirely different degree from their students, assistants, and 
even some of their own colleagues. In 1924, the famous Jewish chemistry professor 
Richard Willstätter resigned from his teaching position to protest the anti-Semitism 
that repeatedly swayed his colleagues’ choices of new faculty members. In his memoirs, 
Willstätter recounts that Germany was gripped by desperation after the defeat of 1918, 
which gave rise to first left- and then right-wing radicalism. Instead of quieting down 
after the political disturbances subsided after 1923, the universities became hot beds 
of nationalist and anti-Semitic feeling: 
The universities succumbed to a form of right-wing radicalism. 
Shortly after being relieved from the fear of Communism, strong 
or at least apparently strong individuals in the faculty and in the 
[Bavarian] Academy [of Sciences] succumbed to the old chauvin-
ism once again.46 
Willstätter did not suffer at first from direct anti-Semitic actions against him 
because he was a well-respected and revered teacher. Nazi students in his classes re-
spectfully took off their party pins before entering the room, and the party members 
among his assistants told him in embarrassed tones that they rejected the Nazi party’s 
anti-Semitism, which seemed to them “superfluous” to the movement’s political pro-
gram. Outside his classroom, however, anti-Semitism was rampant, and Willstätter 
remembers that the corridors of the university were plastered with red posters saying: 
“No German youth can be allowed to sit at the feet of a Jewish teacher.”47 
To his great dismay, Willstätter now found that in addition to a radicalizing 
student body, there was an emerging discriminatory pattern: German universities were 
treating Jewish and “German” scholars unequally, in clear violation of the Weimar 
constitution and also of German academic tradition.48 Even his own natural science 
department suffered increasingly from anti-Semitic tendencies. In the early 1920s, 
a large majority of his faculty colleagues repeatedly rejected highly qualified Jewish 
scholars as candidates for teaching positions at Munich University “because they did 
not want a scholar in their midst whom they suspected of being of Jewish heritage.”49 
After seeing three Jewish scholars successively rejected as candidates, Willstätter re-
signed in protest in 1924 and could not be persuaded to reconsider his decision.50 
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His successor, Heinrich Wieland, disagreed with Willstätter’s assessment that the Ger-
man universities were strongly influenced by anti-Semitism. Yet the noted economist 
Lujo Brentano agreed with Willstätter, his old friend. Brentano wrote in a letter that 
many of his friends in academic circles had been overjoyed to hear that “a Jew” (i.e., 
Willstätter) had resigned from a prestigious post at Munich University.51 Willstätter’s 
own colleagues had even admitted to him that anti-Semitism had indirectly or directly 
influenced their rejection of the Jewish candidates. He wrote in his memoirs:
A number of colleagues explained to me that their most recent 
appointments were decisively influenced by anti-Semitic consider-
ations, because they wanted to take into account the contemporary 
currents and avoid disturbances. Other colleagues in the faculty 
majority have explained that their decision was swayed not by 
anti-Semitism but by opportunism.52
As Willstätter’s account shows, the professors of Munich University, while not rabid 
anti-Semites, nonetheless did succumb early to the deepening discrimination around 
them, choosing to accommodate it or profit from it rather than to oppose it. Such 
moral weakness in the face of political and so-called racial extremism, already obvious 
in academia in 1924, would allow Nazism an easy time in taking over all German 
society in 1933 – there simply was no real resistance. Writing in 1940, Willstätter 
regarded the educational elite’s spinelessness as the major reason for the success of 
Nazism in 1933: 
The German people have given free rein to the most brutal, thug-
gish, and cruel anti-Semitism, whose precondition was the consent 
and acquiescence of thousands of opportunists and millions of weak 
and cowardly people. From the beginning, the universities and 
academic societies showed themselves as the weakest of them all. 
No one opposed the end of free expression and individualism.53 
Willstätter concluded that the majority of his colleagues at Munich University were 
simply too weak and characterless to resist Nazism. They jumped on the Nazi band-
wagon not out of conviction or affinity, but out of fear or opportunism.54
The Vossler, Kutscher, and Willstätter examples show clearly that the great 
majority of Munich professors did little to oppose and much to accommodate the 
increasing Nazi radicalism that had entered their university. The rising anti-Semitism 
among the student fraternities led to the dismissal of all Jews from their organiza-
tions in 1926. In the same year, a group of Munich students founded the National 
Socialist German Student Union (Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund or 
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NSDStB).55 As mentioned earlier, the Nazi-influenced student organizations and the 
NSDStB then tried to keep Jews from attending official functions such as the Reichs-
gründungsfeier in 1927.56 
In the following years, the NSDStB managed to dominate student politics at 
Munich University despite winning only a third of the seats in the executive branch of 
the student self-government (Allgemeiner Studentenausschuss or AStA).57 Nazi student 
agitators began to disturb and disrupt lectures and university events that were, in 
their opinion, not in line with Nazi ideology. They also frequently uttered threats of 
future retaliation against professors who were either openly pro-democratic or Jewish. 
This led all but the most courageous professors to abstain from any form of political 
opposition to Nazism even prior to 1933.58 
A good example of the extreme pressure pro-Weimar and Jewish professors now 
faced from the NSDStB was the treatment of Munich law professor Hans Nawiasky. 
Because of his assumed Jewish heritage and his public support of the Weimar constitu-
tion, Nazi students began in 1930 to disturb his lectures and to make threats against 
him. When Nawiasky compared the Versailles Treaty with the Brest-Litovsk Treaty59 
in one of his lectures in 1931, the NSDStB promptly started what became known as 
the Munich University Riots. The police had to restore order, and the rector decided 
to close down the university for a week.60 
While the university administration did try in the early 1930s to rein in the NS-
DStB by threatening to dismiss its student leaders, its threats turned out to be empty. 
More concerned with avoiding unrest, the university administration shrank from a real 
confrontation. This is why the NSDStB’s intimidation tactics worked as intended. After 
Nawiasky’s disastrous clash with Nazi students, fewer and fewer democratically-minded 
Munich professors dared to speak up in defense of the Weimar Republic. Nawiasky’s fate 
had given them a clear prospect of what would be in store for Weimar-supporters if the 
Nazis ever came to power. As though it were a self-fulfilling prophecy, their assessment 
proved correct. After Hitler became chancellor in January 1933, Nazi thugs raided 
Nawiasky’s apartment, but luckily for him, he was not at home. Upon hearing about 
the raid, Nawiasky immediately fled to Switzerland, where he stayed until 1946.61 
As the Nawiasky case clearly shows, the political environment changed com-
pletely in January 1933. Instead of a weak democratic government that the professors 
could reject, criticize, or ignore, they now faced a burgeoning totalitarian dictator-
ship that was bent on forcing its will upon the German universities and that would 
severely punish any act of opposition. In the eyes of many professors, it seemed best 
to respond to this dramatic political change with adaptation or Selbstgleichschaltung 
(self-coordination) rather than resistance.
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Was adaptation the only alternative? In his memoir, the former Munich chemist 
Willstätter blamed the universities for having given in too easily to the Nazi usurpa-
tion of their academic freedoms: “The universities . . . started to fall silent early on.”62 
While he reproached his colleagues for a lack of courage, it is clear that the professors’ 
adaptive behavior was not based on a newfound (or already existent) Nazi mindset, 
but on their weakness and cowardice.63
The fact that German scholars felt too weak to resist did not, however, make 
them less guilty of abetting a criminal regime. Entrenched in a comparably safe envi-
ronment of state employment and enjoying high social prestige and moral authority, 
German scholars would have been in a formidable position to deny the Nazis what 
they needed most: the seal of approval by the respectable educational elite who would 
lend scientific authority to many, if not all, of the Nazis’ political and racial concepts. 
While it is understandable for human behavior to choose the path of least resistance 
in the face of political pressure, it is also easy to agree with Willstätter that German 
professors as a group – at Munich and at other universities – yielded too easily and 
frequently supported the regime more than necessary.
Let us return to the original question of whether the German professors in general 
acted as Weimar’s undertakers by not supporting the new democratic order and thereby 
playing into the hands of Hitler. The examples posed above from Munich University 
– which I argue are representative as regards the faculties at other German universities 
– show that the majority of professors were no friends of the Weimar order. Only a small 
minority of academics was willing to champion the cause of democracy, and most of 
that group fell silent when Nazi pressure increased in the late twenties and thirties. Yet 
it would be misleading to interpret the professors’ silence simply as approval or even as 
an embrace of Nazi ideology – as historians such as Anselm Faust or Bruno Reimann 
have done.64 The Munich case demonstrates that German academia was not committed 
to Nazi ideology before 1933, but that the scholars kept silent because of cowardice, op-
portunism, or both. While this gives the German educational elite a partial responsibility 
for the demise of Weimar, it does not make them Hitler’s eager collaborators.
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Jahren des Dritten Reiches, 1933–1936 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1995), 43; “liberal-konservativ bis  
deutschnational.” 
8. Heiber,  Der Professor im Dritten Reich, 36. The formulation preceding the quotation is a very close 
paraphrase.  “Auch der deutsche Professor dieser, der politisch mausgrauen Kategorie, liebte den Staat nicht, 
dem er diente.… Sie hasste sie [die Republik] zwar nicht…, aber sie beobachtete das politische Geschehen 
mit kühlster Skepsis.” 
9. Ibid., 34. Heiber (p. 37) quotes the phrase “neutrale Loyalität” from Hellmut Seier, “Marburg in derWeimarer                  
Republik, 1918–1933,” in Erhart Dettmering and Rudolf Grenz, ed., Marburger Geschichte: Rückblick auf die 
Stadtgeschichte (Marburg, 1980), 587. 
10. Böhm,  Selbstverwaltung, 42.
11. Heiber,  Der Professor im Dritten Reich, 37. “Man darf also für eine beachtliche Majorität der ‘Partei der 
Parteilosen’, der angeblich ‘unpolitischen’, ein recht ähnliches politischen Grundverständnis annehmen wie 
bei der sich lautstark deutschnational artikulierenden Fraktion, nur mit größerer Zurückhaltung, in kühler 
Passivität, bei einer Standortbestimmung vielleicht einen halben Schritt weiter zur Mitte anzusetzen.”
12. Böhm,  Selbstverwaltung, 42. “Die Mehrheit der Hochschullehrer konnte und wollte kein positives 
Verhältnis zum Weimarer Staat gewinnen, weil eben die rückwärtsgewandte Betrachtung dominierte, 
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die ‘nostalgische Erinnerung’ an das Kaiserreich und der Wunsch nach nationalem Wiederaufstieg, nach 
Wiederherstellung der alten Größe.”
13. Rüdiger vom Bruch and Rainer A. Müller, ed.,         Erlebte und gelebte Universität: Die Universität München 
im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Pfaffenhofen: W. Ludwig Verlag, 1986), 17.
14. Munich University Archive (UAM), E-II-2517, K.A. v. Müller,         Fragebogen supplement, n.d. [1945].
15. Wolfgang Sauer, “National Socialism: Totalitarianism or Fascism?,” The American Historical Review 73, 
no. 2 (1967): 420.
16. Reginald H. Phelps, “Hitler and the Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, ” in: The American Historical Review 68, 
no. 4 (1963): 976.
17. Kurt Eisner had been on his way to parliament to resign after his Independent Socialist Democratic Party 
of Germany (USPD) had lost the state elections in February 1919. However, many Munich conservatives 
perceived him still as a threat, because before becoming the elected head of government in Bavaria, Eisner 
had been the organizer of the socialist revolution in Bavaria that had overthrown the Wittelsbacher monarchy 
back in November 1918. See Heiber,  Die Republik von Weimar, 45ff.
18. Bruch and Müller, ed.,     Erlebte und gelebte Universität, 205–206. “An der Universität herrschte Panik. 
Ein paar verwegene junge Kerle, Studenten und Studentinnen, forderten den Dekanen die Schlüssel ihrer 
Archive ab. Sie bedrohten die Universität, der man vorwarf, die Fühlung mit den Strömungen der Zeit und 
der Forderungen der Straße verloren zu haben. Auch wurden einige meiner Kollegen persönlich bedroht. 
Übrigens hatten eine Anzahl der Professoren, die politisch weiter rechts standen, in aller Eile die Stadt für 
einige Wochen zu verlassen.”
19. Ibid., 18: “die Universität zu revolutionieren”; “Volksuniversität”; “proletarische Übergangshochschule.”      
20. During the Third Reich, Franz Ritter von Epp (1868–1946) served as the Nazis’ Reichsstatthalter of 
Bavaria between 1933 and 1945. 
21. Two historians note “das Schreckbild des ‘jüdischen Bolschewisten’”; see      Burkhard Asmuss and Arnulf Scriba, 
“Die Münchner Räterepublik, ” Deutsches Historisches Museum, http://www.dhm.de/lemo/html/weimar/       
revolution/raeterepublik/index.html (accessed 29 June 2007).
22. Ian Kershaw, Hitler, 1889–1936: Hubris (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), 121–22.
23. A list of speakers cited in Ernst Deuerlein’s article shows that Geheimrat Professor Erich Marcks was another 
Munich professor who taught an “Aufklärungskurs” or political instruction course for Mayr’s unit. See Ernst Deuerlein,   
“Hitlers Eintritt in die Politik und die Reichswehr,”        Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 2, no. 7 (1959): 179.  
24. Kershaw,  Hitler, 1889–1936: Hubris, 123.
25. Ibid. 
26. Deuerlein, “Hitlers Eintritt in die Politik und die Reichswehr,” 186. “Vom bloßen Kursteilnehmer war er [Hitler]                 
zum Angehörigen des Aufklärungskommandos und dann zum politischen Mitarbeiter Mayrs ‘avanciert.’”
27. Ibid., 188–89.
28. In a similar way, Ian Kershaw regards Captain Mayr as “one of the ‘midwives’ of Hitler’s political ‘career.’” 
Kershaw, Hitler, 1889–1936: Hubris, 122. Deuerlein argues that Captain Mayr’s approval of Hitler’s anti-
Semitic ideas was an important confirmation for their correctness. See Deuerlein, “Hitlers Eintritt in die    
Politik und die Reichswehr,” 185. 
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29. Another Nazi leader who studied at Munich University was Rudolf Hess, who attended lectures by the 
political geographer Karl Haushofer. “His geographical-determinist teachings provided an answer to Hess’s 
search for a theoretical way out of Germany’s shame, but Hess was also personally on good terms with his 
teacher.” Dietrich Orlow, “Rudolf Hess: Deputy Führer,” in Ronald and Rainer Zitelmann Smelser, ed., 
The Nazi Elite (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 74.
30. Böhm,  Selbstverwaltung, 48. Böhm mentions as Nazi sympathizers the historian Max Buchner, Fritz 
Lenz, Friedrich Wilhelm v. Bissing, Wilhelm Pinder, and Alfred Lorenz. Lorenz had even become a member 
of the party. See also Christoph Weisz, Geschichtsauffassung und politisches Denken Münchener Historiker der 
Weimarer Zeit (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1970), 259.
31. Böhm,  Selbstverwaltung, 48. 
32. For example the political geographer Karl Haushofer, the historian Karl Alexander von Müller, and the                
forestry professor Karl Leopold Escherich. Haushofer was well acquainted with his student Rudolf Hess         
and knew Hitler quite well. Despite sympathizing with the Nazi cause, he never joined the Nazi Party. See 
Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Karl Haushofer: Leben und Werk, 2 vols. (Boppard am Rhein: Boldt, 1979). Von Müller       
was an early Nazi sympathizer, but joined the Party only in 1933. Escherich was a member of the early Nazi 
Party until it was outlawed in 1923, but he never rejoined the refounded party after 1925. See Werner   
Schelling, “Karl Alexander von Müller (1882–1964): Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Geschichtswissenschaft           
und des politischen Denkens in Deutschland” (Ph.D. diss., Universität Wien, 1975), 153.       
33. As well as one honorary and one retired professor. See Böhm,  Selbstverwaltung, 48.
34. Ibid. 
35. Ibid.; “die nationale Einstellung der Mehrheit der Professoren sich selten scharf oder aggressiv und nie radikal               
artikulierte und man v. a. in den letzten Jahren der Republik bei allen Gegensätzen auf Mäßigung bedacht war.”
36. Ibid., 46.
37. Ibid., 45. See also Bruch and Müller, ed.,         Erlebte und gelebte Universität, 18.
38. Böhm,  Selbstverwaltung, 45f .
39. Karl Vossler,    Politik und Geistesleben. Rede zur Reichsgründungsfeier im Januar 1927 und drei weitere 
Ansprachen (Munich, 1927), 3–11. For example, Vossler criticized (4–5): “Immer in neuen Verpuppungen 
die alte Unvernunft: ein metaphysisches, spekulatives, romantisches, fanatisches, abstraktes, irrationalistisches 
und mystisches Politisieren.... ” 
40. Hans Peter Bleuel,    Deutschlands Bekenner: Professoren zwischen Kaiserreich und Diktatur (Bern: Scherz, 
1968), 205: “im Kern echt, nur in der Form undiszipliniert.”
41. Artur Kutscher,   Der Theaterprofessor. Ein Leben für die Wissenschaft vom Theater (Munich: Ehrenwirth, 
1960), 206. 
42. Ibid., 207. “Wertvoll an Hitlers Streben erschien mir in den zwanziger Jahren sein Kampf gegen                
die Selbstsucht wohlhabender Kreise, sein Appell an das Gemeinschaftsgefühl und –denken, an die 
Opferbereitschaft für das Ganze, sein Bemühen, den Arbeiter marxistischen Bekenntnisses mit nationalem 
Geiste zu erfüllen, der Gedanke der deutschen Einheit unter Einbeziehung Österreichs. Freilich, zu übersehen 
waren nicht die negativen Seiten der Uniformierung des deutschen Lebens. Die Tendenzen der Loslösung 
der Jugend vom Elternhaus, die Leugnung Gottes, die Unterdrückung des Individuums, die Übermacht der 
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Partei, die sich selbst in den privatesten Bezirken äußerte, die ‘Erziehung’ der Jugendlichen durch Führer, 
die bildungsmäßig oft unter ihnen standen: all dies wurde zwar gesehen, aber doch angesichts der scheinbar 
stärkeren nationalen und sozialen Ziele von den meisten Beobachtern zurückgestellt.”
43. Bruch and Müller, ed.,     Erlebte und gelebte Universität, 337; “typischer Deutschnationaler.”
44. Ibid., 338. “Die Juden… haben immer eine Gehirnwindlung mehr als alle anderen Menschen.”             
45. See Notker Hammerstein,    Antisemitismus und deutsche Universitäten, 1871–1933 (Frankfurt am Main: 
Campus, 1995), 72ff.
46. Richard Willstätter,   Aus meinem Leben (Weinheim: Verlag Chemie, 1949), 208. “Die Universitäten waren 
einer Art von Rechtsradikalismus verfallen. Starke oder stark scheinende Persönlichkeiten im Lehrkörper 
und in der Akademie, kaum befreit von ihrer Angst vor kommunistischen Umwälzungen, erlagen wieder 
ihrer alten Sünde des Chauvinismus.”
47. Ibid., 341. “Kein deutscher Jüngling darf künftig zu Füßen eines jüdischen Lehrers sitzen.”          
48. Ibid., 399.
49. Ibid., 343; “weil sie nicht einen Gelehrten von vermutetermaßen jüdischer…Abstammung in ihrer          
Mitte haben wollten.”
50. Ibid., 346–51. Willstätter stayed on the faculty until his chosen successor, Professor Heinrich Wieland 
of Freiburg, was safely in place in September 1925. He continued to participate in all faculty meetings 
for several more years, but stopped being invited in the early 1930s. After 1933, Willstätter’s name was 
silently removed from the university directory and many of his friends at the university stopped having 
contact with him. Willstätter remained in Munich until 1939 and only barely escaped to Switzerland 
before it became impossible for Jews to leave Germany. He left Germany with the greatest reluctance and 
died in exile in 1942. 
51. Ibid., 348. 
52. Ibid., 344. “Eine Anzahl Kollegen hat mir erklärt, dass die letzten Berufungsvorschläge von antisemitischen            
Erwägungen entscheidend beeinflusst worden waren, und zwar in dem Sinne, den Zeitströmungen Rechnung 
zu tragen und Unruhe zu vermeiden. Andere Kollegen von der Fakultätsmehrheit haben mir erklärt, nicht 
so sehr antisemitische Rücksichten als überhaupt Opportunitätserwägungen seien für ihr Vorgehen bei der 
Berufung entscheidend gewesen.”
53. Ibid., 397. “Das deutsche Volk hat dem rohesten, räuberischen und grausamen Antisemitismus freies Spiel            
gelassen, dessen Voraussetzung die Zustimmung und die Duldung von Tausenden Vorteilssuchender und 
von Millionen Schwacher und Feiger gewesen ist. In der Schwäche standen von Anbeginn die Universitäten 
und gelehrten Gesellschaften voran. Bedenken gegen die Unterdrückung der freien Meinungsäußerung 
und des Individualismus wurden nicht laut.”
54. Ibid., 313ff.  
55. Bruch and Müller, ed.,     Erlebte und gelebte Universität, 18f.
56. Böhm,  Selbstverwaltung, 45ff.
57. Ibid., 56.  
58. Heiber,  Der Professor im Dritten Reich, 37.
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59. Before their ultimate defeat the Germans had forced the Russians to sign the very unfavorable Treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk in March 1918, but the Nazis and other German nationalists refused to see any similarities 
between this treaty and the Versailles Treaty of 1919. 
60. Böhm, Selbstverwaltung, 55. The NSDStB orchestrated the riots to put pressure on Nawiasky. While 
they did not succeed in driving him from the university, the event demonstrated how strongly the political 
atmosphere at Munich University had already shifted toward the Nazis’ völkisch-nationalism years before the 
seizure of power in 1933. For more information see Michael Behrendt, “Hans Nawiasky und die Münchner           
Studentenkrawalle von 1931,” in Elisabeth Kraus, ed.,     Die Universität München im Dritten Reich: Aufsätze 
(Munich, 2006), 15–42.
61. Upon his return to Munich in 1946, Nawiasky became one of the fathers of the new Bavarian 
Constitution. For more information see Hans Zacher, “Hans Nawiasky, ” in:           Neue Deutsche Biographie, 
ed. Hans Günter Hockerts (Berlin, 1999), 19:4–6.
62. Willstätter,  Aus meinem Leben, 313.
63. Heiber,  Der Professor im Dritten Reich, 47.
64. See Faust, “Professoren für die NSDAP,” 10ff., and Reimann, “Hochschule zwischen Kaiserreich und              
Diktatur, ” 11–25.  
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Minutes of the Seventy-eighth Annual Meeting 
6 March 2010
SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF ARCHIVES AND  HISTORY      
CENTER, COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA
BREAKFAST/REGISTRATION: 7:30–8:45 a.m.
OFFICERS’ MEETING: 8:30–8:45 a.m.
SESSION A: 8:50–10:10 a.m.
Panel 1: Slavery and Slaveholders in the Colonial Era
Chair/comment: Paul Thompson, North Greenville University
Paper 1: “Hearing Africa: Early Modern Europeans’ Auditory Perceptions of the Af-
rican Other,” Amy Long Caffee, University of South Carolina
Paper 2: “‘Enlightened’ Slavery: The Evolution of South Carolina Slaveholders, 
1669–1820,” Meggan A. Farish, Waccamaw Center for Cultural and Historical 
Studies, Coastal Carolina University
Paper 3: “‘The Way Slaves Married in Slavery Time:’ South Carolina, Broomstick 
Weddings and the Ubiquity of Slave Culture throughout the Antebellum South,” 
Tyler D. Parry, University of South Carolina
Panel 2: Reflections on South Carolina in the Antebellum Period
Chair/comment: Lewie Reece, Anderson University
Paper 1: “‘Ever Able, Manly, Just, and Heroic:’ Preston Brooks and the Myth of 
Southern Manhood,” Kenneth A. Deitreich, West Virginia University
Paper 2: “Plain Folk of Color: Free People of Color and Common Whites in the 
Rural Charleston District, 1800–1860,” David Dangerfield, University of South 
Carolina
Paper 3: “‘We Will Strike at the Head and Demolish the Monster’: The Impact of 
Joel R. Poinsett’s correspondence on President Andrew Jackson during the Nullifica-
tion Crisis, 1832–1833,” Joshua Cain, Georgia Southern University
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Panel 3: Life and Work in Twentieth Century South Carolina
Chair/Comment: Andrew Myers, USC Upstate
Paper 1: “Covered with Rust: the 1922 Columbia Streetcar Strike,” 
Jeffrey M. Leatherwood, West Virginia University
Paper 2: “Just Plain Hard Work: Women and Farm Labor in the Rural South,” 
Matthew C. Roberts, Converse College
Paper 3: “History and Genealogy: Giving Voice to the Voiceless: Case Studies in 
History and Genealogy,” Harris M. Bailey, Jr., Old Edgefield District African Amer-
ican Genealogical Society
SESSION B: 10:30–11:50 a.m.
Panel 4: National and International Politics in the Twentieth Century
Chair: Edward Lee, Winthrop University
Comment: Jeffery Cook, North Greenville University
Paper 1: “Undertakers of the Weimar Republic? The Nazification of Munich Profes-
sors, 1918–1933,” Stefan Wiecki, Presbyterian College
Paper 2: “Stanley Morse and the 1952 Eisenhower Campaign,” Jeremy Monroe 
Richards, Gordon College
Panel 5: 1960s Sport in the International Setting
Chair/Comment: Fritz Hamer, S.C. State Museum
Paper 1: “High Costs and Hidden Wrenches: Contests for Physical Space in British 
Football in the 1960s and 1970s,” Brett Bebber, Presbyterian College
Paper 2: “Hard Foul: The U.S./Soviet Basketball Rivalry, 1965–1975,” Kevin With-
erspoon, Lander University
Panel 6: A Century of Black Educational Experiences in South Carolina
Chair: Rebekah Dobrasko, S.C. Department of Archives & History
Comment: Janet Hudson, University of South Carolina
Paper 1:  “The Jenkins Orphanage: Saving African-American Orphans, Making 
Model Citizens,” Nathan Johnson, Park Guide, Fort Sumter National Monument
Paper 2: “A Study of Educational Inequalities in South Carolina: Creating A Move-
ment Against Segregation,” Celia James, University of South Carolina 
Paper 3: “Integrating Rock Hill,” Luci Vaden, Rawlinson Road Middle School
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Panel 7: Military History in Late-Eighteenth Century U.S. History
Chair/Comment: Marvin Cann, Professor Emeritus, Lander University
Paper 1: “Atrocity Stories as a Teaching Tool for the Rules of War in South Caroli-
na’s Revolution,” Rebecca Brannon, USC Aiken
Paper 2: “Taming the Fox: Francis Marion and His Commanders, 1780–1782,” 
Tom Powers, USC Sumter
Paper 3: “‘Were You Entitled To An Answer’: General Anthony Wayne and Major 
William Campbell on the Banks of the Maumee,” Sarah Miller, USC Salkehatchie
LUNCH: 12:00–12:45 p.m.
KEYNOTE ADDRESS: 12:45–1:30 p.m.
Dr.William Ramsey, “You Say Yemassee, I Say Yamasee: Recasting the Early History 
of South Carolina”
MEMBERS’ MEETING: 1:30–2:00 p.m.
President Andrew Myers called the business meeting to order at 1:30 p.m. after a 
thoughtful keynote address by William Ramsey about his recent book The Yamasee War. 
The minutes of the 9 March 2009 annual meeting at the Campus Life Center of the 
University of South Carolina Upstate were approved as submitted and printed.
Treasurer Rodger Stroup presented the Treasurer’s report indicating that current in-
come/expenses for the year is positive with a balance of $1451.87. It was noted that 
this is the last year that Rodger will serve as Treasurer. A resolution of thanks for all 
his work for the association was passed unanimously by the membership.
Members of the executive committee and from the floor nominated the following 
individuals for service:
• President – Kevin Witherspoon, Lander University
• Vice-President – Paul Thompson, North Greenville University
• Secretary – Michael Kohl, Clemson University
• Treasurer – Eric Emerson, South Carolina Department of Archives & History
• At Large Member of the Executive Committee – Sarah Miller, University of South 
Carolina Salkehatchie (term expires 2013)
The nominees were elected without opposition and by acclamation.
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President Myers turned the gavel over to President-elect Kevin Witherspoon, who 
thanked the South Carolina Department of Archives & History for hosting the meet-
ing; after brief consultation, he also announced that the College of Charleston will 
host the next annual meeting of the Association on 5 March 2011.
The business meeting was adjourned at 1:50 p.m.
SESSION C: 2:00–3:20 p.m.
Panel 8: Reflections on Religion, Race, and Gender Issues in the Atlantic World 
Chair/Comment: Brenda Schoolfield, Bob Jones University
Paper 1:  “Refugees, Race Issues, and Rituals: A Catholic Community in Charleston 
South Carolina, 1790–1820,” Christina Shedlock, College of Charleston 
Paper 2: “‘Differences in opinion or practice in matters of Religious concernment’: 
The Dynamics of Promoting Liberty of Conscience in Proprietary Carolina, 1630–
1687,” Neal Polhemus, College of Charleston
Paper 3: “‘Firm and Immovable as Rocks’: The Empowerment of Native American 
Women within the Jesuit Missions of New France,” Ivy Farr, College of Charleston
Paper 4: “Satan, Africans, and Jews in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: An 
Examination of Formation of the Image of the Devil,” Hilary Lentz, College of 
Charleston/The Citadel
Panel 9: Society and Education in Twentieth Century South Carolina
Chair/Comment: Katherine D. Cann, Spartanburg Methodist College
Paper 1: “A Centennial Celebration: Anderson University Turns 100,” Joyce Wood, 
Anderson University
Paper 2: “The State versus the Volunteer: Power and Promotion in the Formation of 
the South Carolina Illiteracy Commission 1917–1918,” Mary Mac Ogden, Univer-
sity of South Carolina
Panel 10: 
Moderator/Comment: Ron Cox, USC Lancaster
Special screening of the documentary film: “Scarred Justice: The Orangeburg Mas-
sacre 1968” (2009), directed by Bestor Cram and Judy Richardson
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Constitution
I. The name of the organization shall be the South Carolina Historical Association.
II.  The objects of this Association shall be to promote historical studies in the state of 
South Carolina, to bring about a closer relationship among persons living this state who 
are interested in history, and to encourage the preservation of historical records.
III. Membership shall be open to anyone interested in the objectives of the Associa-
tion. Annual dues shall be determined by the Executive Committee.  
     After having been a member of the Association for ten years and upon reaching 
the age of sixty-five, any member may be designated an emeritus member by the sec-
retary.  Emeritus members have all the rights and privileges of membership without 
being required to pay the annual dues. 
     Student members shall pay annual dues at half-rates.
IV.  The officers shall be president, vice-president, secretary, and treasurer; these shall 
be elected at each annual meeting.  The Executive Committee shall normally nominate 
one person for each office.  The vice-president shall be the automatic nominee for 
president.  Nomination from the floor may be made for any office.  Officers shall have 
the duties and perform the functions customarily attached to their respective offices 
with such others as may from time to time be prescribed. 
V.   The Executive Committee shall be composed of officers, the editor of The Pro-
ceedings, and three other members elected for a term of three years.  The duties of the 
Executive Committee shall be to fix the date and place of the annual meeting, to attend 
to the publication of The Proceedings, to prepare a program for the annual meeting, to 
prepare a list of nominations for the officers of the Association as provided in Article 
IV, to supervise the expenditures of the Association’s funds, and such other duties as 
may from time to time be assigned to them by the Association.  
There shall be such other committees as the president may appoint, or be in-
structed to appoint, by resolutions of the Association.
VI. There shall be an annual meeting of the Association at the time and place appointed 
by the Executive Committee.
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VII. A. The Association shall publish annually its proceedings to be known as The 
Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association.   It shall contain the minutes of 
the annual meeting together with such papers and documents selected by the Executive 
Committee.  Each fifth year, The Proceedings shall include a copy of the constitution 
of the Association.  At least every five years, The Proceedings shall include a current 
list of the membership. 
B. All papers read at the annual meeting shall become the property of the Associa-
tion except as otherwise may be approved by the Executive Committee.
C. The Executive Committee shall annually elect an editor of The Proceedings 
who shall have authority to appoint an associate editor and shall be a member of the 
Executive Committee.
VIII.  In the event of the dissolution, the remaining assets of the Association, if any, 
shall be donated by the Executive Committee to another organization which shares 
the objects and aims of the Association.
IX.  The Publications Endowment Fund exists to supplement the income available 
for the publication of The Proceedings.  Contributions may be made by anyone, and 
they will be acknowledged in writing.
 The Fund will be administered by three trustees:  the president, the treasurer, and 
the editor of The Proceedings.  The trustees shall invest the Fund so as to 
obtain a secure and steady income and report annually to the membership the status 
of the Fund.
 The trustees may designate annually a sum no greater than 80 percent of the 
earnings of the Fund to defray the cost of printing The Proceedings and add the surplus 
of earnings each year to the principal
 Should the Executive Committee determine that the Fund is not longer necessary 
for the purpose for which it was established, they shall recommend that this Article be 
removed from the constitution.  If the Fund is liquidated, the Executive Committee 
shall make an unrestricted gift of the principal to the endowment fund of the University 
of South Caroliniana Society or similar historical repository in South Carolina and 
transfer the balance of the earning to the treasury of the Association.
X.  The constitution may be amended by a two-thirds vote of the members present 
at the annual meeting.
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